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Abstract 
Decades before the elimination of gender restrictions in the U.S. military, ground combat 
was an equal opportunity issue for women.  Direct combat units, such as infantry and 
artillery, are now open to female enlistment.  The purpose of this study was to examine 
the efforts, challenges and/or successes, of incorporating women into a U.S. Army 
combat brigade in a single state.  The frame-critical approach was used to outline the 
competing arguments between supporters and opponents of women in combat.  The 
research questions guiding the study included how gender integration is perceived with 
regards to strength and survivability of the unit, and how future conflict will govern 
decisions about sending women into combat.  A qualitative case study was employed 
with semi structured interviews with commanders of the combat brigade, given their 
proximity to the issue and responsibility in the implementation process.  The selected 
brigade was serving as the initial test bed of evaluation for the rest of the state’s combat 
units.  The data collected via the interviews were cross-checked with documentary data 
including declassified memorandums, technical reports, and execution orders.  During the 
analysis phase, the data were organized and coded to identify themes related to the 
experiences of the command structure.  Overall, the officers were supportive of the policy 
mandate and expressed viewpoints that validated both oppositional and advocacy 
arguments.  The implications for social change include how the military is working to 
validate performance standards to positively influence policy on gender integration, and 
the combat brigade utilized in this study is an example for the rest of the United States as 
it is slated to have the most female recruits for combat positions than any other state 
beginning in 2017.         
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Background to the Study 
 On January 24, 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and General Martin 
Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a memorandum that eliminated 
gender restrictions for direct ground combat (Barry, 2013).  Before that decision, an 
exclusion policy, known as the Aspin Rule, had been in place since 1994 preventing 
women from serving in direct combat roles (McNulty, 2012).  Secretary Panetta claimed 
that lifting gender-based barriers within the military would improve the fighting force as 
a whole (Sisk, 2013).  General Dempsey reaffirmed that claim by stating that they were 
acting to strengthen the armed forces.  However, the only justification given was the 
enhancement of equal opportunity (Maginnis, 2013).  During a Senate Armed Services 
Committee hearing in 1992, the 27th commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert 
Barrow, delivered a candid testimony in which he stated that any discussion about 
women in combat “should not be about women’s rights, equal opportunity, or career 
enhancement.  It is about, most assuredly…combat effectiveness, combat readiness, and 
winning the next conflict” (Maginnis, 2013, pp. 1–2).  Nonetheless, more than 2 decades 
later, the decision to overturn the ban was hailed as a triumph for civilian feminists who 
viewed ground combat as a glass-ceiling issue for women’s equal opportunity.   
 Disagreement still exists regarding the soundness and feasibility of the new 
policy.  Schön and Rein (1994) wrote about intractable policy controversies which are 
seemingly resistant to resolution when appealing to logic, research, and evidence.  Some 
literature suggested that military organizational culture and structure needs to be carefully 
studied and reconsidered altogether (Egnell, 2013; Farnell, 2009).  According to Schön 
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and Rein, policy controversies result from opposing parties holding conflicting frames.  
Schön and Rein defined frames as the “underlying structures of belief, perception, and 
appreciation” (p. 23).  The issue of women in combat is a useful example to explore in 
terms of policy frames.  Each party’s conflicting frame shapes their policy positions and 
thus determines what counts as facts and what arguments are considered relevant (Schön 
& Rein, 1994).  Feminists framed the question about women in combat as an equal rights 
issue (Maginnis, 2013).  Opponents contend that the logic of assigning women to combat 
is contradicted by scientific evidence, empirical data, the experiences of other nations, 
and common sense (King, 2013; Maginnis, 2013; Simons, 2000).  In addition, no easy 
and immediate answers exist concerning the facilitation and implementation of the new 
policy (Barry, 2013).   
 Women have served the country honorably throughout history – from traditional 
roles, such as scouts, spies or nurses since the Revolutionary War, to combat support in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (Maginnis, 2013; McGirk, 2006; McNulty, 2012).  Service 
opportunities for women in the United States were limited in the past, but combat support 
roles increased steadily with time, and that trend expanded internationally as well (Barry, 
2013).  Currently, the United States has no restrictions on women serving in the U.S. 
Navy and U.S. Air Force.  Women account for nearly 15% of the current service 
members in the U.S. military (Farnell, 2009; Mattocks et al., 2012).  Approximately 80% 
of the U.S. military is composed of combat support.  Combat support is every bit as 
critical to the overall mission as direct combat roles.   
 Indeed, women’s contributions during the nation’s wartime are to be commended 
and appreciated.  Several foreign case studies such as Russia, Israel, Italy, and France, 
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had women actively fight in defense of their countries during wartime.  On the one hand, 
those foreign case studies were incidents of national survival and wartime exigency; it 
did not become a postwar normality (Maginnis, 2013).  Israel removed women from the 
front lines after her war for independence in 1948, and until the 1990s most combat 
positions remained closed to women (Epstein, et al., 2013).  And for 2 centuries, in the 
United States, it was considered unthinkable to send women directly into violent front 
line combat (Maginnis, 2013; McGirk, 2006).  A major cultural shift may have occurred 
for it to be considered socially acceptable today.  Farnell (2009) indicated that a cultural 
shift already occurred during the mid-1970s out of necessity for more military volunteers.  
Societal norms changed in response to the need, and likewise, subsequent change to 
institutional culture occurred as more women volunteered to serve (Farnell, 2009).  
 In 1992, the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed 
Forces was designated with the task of collecting and studying evidence regarding 
women in combat.  The success of female combat support during the Persian Gulf War 
prompted the formation of the Commission to consider “legal, policy, and societal 
implications” on gender restrictions in combat (McNulty, 2012, p. 145).  Women filled 
25% of combat support positions during Operation Desert Storm.  Professor Maria 
Lepowsky, who taught women’s studies at the University of Wisconsin, testified at the 
hearing and asserted that placing women in combat would boost “female self-esteem” 
(Horowitz, 2013).  Moreover, Professor Lepowsky believed the positive consequence of a 
feminized military would be increased concern about committing troops to combat in the 
first place (Horowitz, 2013).  On the other hand, testimony from commanders and war 
veterans outlined foreseeable problems.  McNulty (2012) mentioned that the Commission 
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was closely critiqued because committee members were accused of being bias before the 
study began (p. 146).  Retrospectively, the commission “heard no evidence that putting 
women in combat would improve the Army’s ability to accomplish its mission” 
(Maginnis, 2013, p. 23).  In perspective to the recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Professor Lepowsky’s hopes were not confirmed based on the physical and psychiatric 
casualty rates for women (Maginnis, 2013; Maguen et al., 2012; Mattocks et al., 2012).    
 National opinion dramatically shifted between 1991 and the decision to lift the 
combat ban in 2013.  A 1991 Gallup survey indicated that only 38% of Americans 
favored putting women in combat (Brown, 2013).  From 2001 to 2010, news outlets 
conducted surveys that revealed a majority of the public supporting women serving in 
ground combat positions (McNulty, 2012).  The prolonged counter-insurgency operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan certainly played a role in that shift as service women became 
casualties in those conflicts (Barry, 2013; Maginnis, 2013).  Both campaigns started out 
as conventional before morphing into asymmetrical warfare.  It was not unusual for 
female service members to be exposed to indirect fire or unofficially serve in combat 
roles by subterfuge or sheer necessity (Falk, 2012; Maginnis, 2013).  Egnell (2013) 
recommended that “needs-based analysis,” such as the development of female 
engagement teams (FETs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, be used when drawing conclusions 
about women’s place in modern warfare (p. 39).  When troop availability was an issue, 
both King (2013) and Maginnis (2013) pointed out that combat exclusion was regularly 
evaded by commanders through the semantic method of attaching rather than assigning 
women to combat units.  This practice was common when dealing with a lack of support 
personnel.  FET training included combat skills, but that was not their primary function.   
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 Archived data of the Army’s “Lioness” program highlighted the missions 
performed by female soldiers accompanying all-male combat units in Iraq as early as 
2003 (King, 2013; McNulty, 2012).  The Lioness program was not viewed as violating 
the existing exclusion policy because the women were not permanently assigned to all-
male units (McNulty, 2012).  Their support roles included civil affairs, personnel 
searches, and planning operations (Maginnis, 2013; McNulty, 2012).  Some situational 
factors resulted in the Lionesses engaging in firefights with the enemy.  Based on the 
experiences of these women, McNulty (2012) noted that the reality of ground conditions 
no longer matched the original direct combat definition.  Although the Lioness program 
only serves as one case study, it is an informative example in assessing female integration 
and professionalized cohesion (Holmstedt, 2007; King, 2013).  In 2011, female service 
members were attached to Special Forces and Ranger outfits as part of cultural support 
teams in Afghanistan (McNulty, 2012, p. 163).  Since 2013, at least 154 female service 
members were killed and close to a thousand were wounded (DeBruyne & Leland, 2015).  
After the Joint Chief’s new policy announcement in 2013, published national polls 
showed favorability toward women in combat as high as 75% (Mataconis, 2013).  
Change in public opinion, however, does not always correspond to views of military 
personnel.  The issue hits closest to those who have or are currently serving.   
 Responses to allowing women in combat have varied from service branch to 
service branch, unit to unit, and individual to individual (Egnell, 2013).  Surveys have 
been conducted within the U.S. armed forces to assess organizational climate (Ulmer, 
2001).  McNulty (2012) reported results from surveys conducted between Air Force 
Academy (USAFA) and West Point cadets that revealed contrast between their views on 
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women serving in ground combat.  McNulty also pointed to the differences between the 
service academies’ cultures as a probable explanation for the divide.  The USAFA cadets 
had a more supportive position.  Those results may be equated to the fact that female U.S. 
Air Force members, not to mention Naval aviators, are accustomed to piloting combat 
jets or attack helicopters.  However, air combat is not the same as sustained ground 
combat; they are two different environments.   
 Army surveys as far back as the 1990s indicate that male and female service 
members have qualms about women serving in direct combat units.  Opposition was 
strong among female soldiers especially if they are forced into combat on an equal basis 
with men (Maginnis, 2013).  The 1992 Presidential Commission conducted a survey 
among retired general and flag officers.  Of the respondents, three-quarters opposed 
ground combat service for women, and 90% opposed women in the infantry (Johnson, 
1992).  Those numbers were highest among retired Marine Corps and Army officers.  A 
2001 survey conducted by the Army Research Institute (ARI) produced similar results.  
Responses among both male and female officers reached the 80th percentile in opposition 
to assigning women to combat (Donnelly, 2007; Maginnis, 2013).  Ironically, the line of 
questioning regarding army soldiers’ views on women in combat was dropped from the 
annual surveys after 2001 (Maginnis, 2013).   
 Secretary Panetta directed the service branches to report to U.S. Congress by May 
of 2013 regarding any retained regulations toward women’s assignment to combat units.  
The burden of proof falls on the armed forces to justify any continued exclusions.  
Military commanders have to adjust accordingly to every new policy.  Egnell (2013) 
claimed that “an effective military organization is one that succeeds in performing the 
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core tasks that the political leadership requests” (p. 36).  With regard to the 
implementation process, Cooper (2012) explained:   
It was assumed that administrators receive policy decisions adopted by 
politicians and then apply their best functional rationality to putting them 
into practice.  Administrators were expected to use their professional 
judgment about the most efficient means for achieving the purposes 
defined by the legislative process (p. 69). 
 Political leadership is not the same as military leadership.  How is the professional 
judgment of military leadership factored into policy issues that impact military readiness 
and effectiveness?  For instance, the United Kingdom’s sex discrimination and equality 
law permits gender exclusion if military judgment determines that “women would 
undermine and degrade combat effectiveness” (Barry, 2013, p. 23).  Examples of military 
leadership challenging civilian leadership include the 1949 public condemnation known 
as the ‘Revolt of the Admirals’ directed at the Department of Defense (McFarland, 1980).  
Similarly, a ‘Revolt of the Generals’ was directed at Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
for not heeding the generals’ prewar warnings leading into the Iraq War (Hanson, 2010).  
In 2010, General Stanley McChrystal was relieved of operational command when he 
publicly disagreed with the Commander-in-Chief’s troop level proposal for Afghanistan.  
This was an example where General McChrystal was held accountable for breaching the 
civilian-military divide (Allen, 2010).   
 The nature of civilian-military relations needs to be understood when connecting 
military effectiveness with political intent (Egnell, 2013).  In retrospect, during testimony 
in 1992, General Barrow commented that sometimes civilian control of the military is 
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abusive and coercive (Maginnis, 2013).  Some policies may not enhance operational 
readiness, but political judgments of civilian administrators can override military 
concerns.  Therefore, the active military has changed policy not because it is the right 
thing to do, but rather to acquiesce to political pressure (Maginnis, 2013).  The issue of 
women in combat is not much different.  The Army Chief of Staff and the Marine 
Commandant are now faced with difficult decisions on how to appropriately facilitate 
opening ground combat to women (Barry, 2013).     
Problem Statement 
 Introducing women into a traditionally all-male environment makes successful 
adaptation more challenging if no women were previously placed in the organization 
(Barry, 2013).  Accordingly, General Dempsey remarked that “standards and critical 
mass” would have to coincide to create the conditions for “upward mobility” of female 
combat soldiers (Press Briefing by Secretary Panetta & General Dempsey from the 
Pentagon, 2013).  Barry (2013) added that evidence from foreign armies suggests that it 
is exceedingly unlikely that female volunteers would reach critical mass to make them a 
“self-sustaining cohort” (p. 28).  An immediate problem is that women in the U.S. armed 
forces have traditionally been held to lower physical training standards than the men 
(Maginnis, 2013).  Secondly, “physiological differences”, which coincide with training 
standards, “remain an enduring problem” (King, 2013, p. 21).  Direct combat missions 
require a higher level of aggression, muscular strength, and aerobic capacity that place 
women at a distinct disadvantage when performing certain tasks (Epstein et al., 2013; 
Falk, 2012; Maginnis, 2013).  Third, the pervasiveness of sexual misconduct is an evident 
problem plaguing the military (King, 2013; Stiehm, 2010).  By its own admission, the 
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Department of Defense is still dealing with an epidemic of sexual assault in the armed 
forces.  Consequently, military sexual trauma (MST) is already a leading cause of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among female service members (Maguen et al., 2012; 
Olsen, 2011).  Lastly, suicide rates have been an issue with the military during the past 
decade, and female veterans are closing the gap when it comes to their suicide rates 
nearly reaching that of male veterans (Zarembo, 2015).  These problems need to be 
managed when opening direct combat positions to women.   
 Notwithstanding counterinsurgency operations, which placed women in a de facto 
state of combat, training for conventional warfare remains a strategic priority for the 
military.  Experientially, combat veterans (namely infantry) can offer testimony to the 
intense physical and mental rigor they undergo to achieve their positions.  The 
progressive-feminist argument simply declares that women are virtually equal to men in 
all matters and should be treated as equals (Farnell, 2009).  Conceptually speaking, men 
and women are equals, but they are not identical.  According to the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2012), proportional equality is a “form of treatment of 
others or distribution is proportional or relatively equal {emphasis added} when it treats 
all relevant persons in relation to their due” (para. 10).  Common sense tells us that there 
are obvious differences between the genders.  Human biology, not culture, determines 
that men and women have different physiological make-ups and are thus unequal in 
relevant aspects.  Some feminist scholars, who advocated for integration, have conceded 
the point that physical disparity between the genders does complicate matters (Farnell, 
2009; King; 2013; Stiehm, 2010).  Even the majority of the Lionesses’ duties resembled 
more police action than direct combat (Maginnis, 2013).  Writing in the Washington Post, 
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former Navy Officer Elizabeth Reintjes De Angelo said that many military women do not 
desire to serve in front line combat, and that they prefer to serve in essential support roles 
where some of their skills are better than men (De Angelo, 2012).  Nevertheless, 
organizational (combat) culture has been at the core of the policy controversy.   
 Farnell (2009) advocated for education reform to undo traditional military cultural 
thinking.  Based on Farnell, the very frames defined by Schön and Rein (1994) are the 
focal point for resolution.  Nevertheless, attitudes change more slowly than laws.  Hence, 
the additional cultural reality of everyday attitudes of male soldiers can possibly 
undermine the process (King, 2013).  Simons (2000) pointed out that unit cohesion and 
morale are no more subject to external or legal demands than combat itself.  Maginnis 
(2013), a former army lieutenant colonel, predicted much more drastic consequences:    
Putting women in combat will seriously weaken our fighting force, 
discourage males who are already abandoning the all-volunteer force, 
encourage sexual improprieties that erode unit cohesion, inflict physical 
and psychological injury on young women fooled into serving in combat, 
and ensure that eighteen-year-old females will be subject to the draft just 
like men (p. x). 
 If enough women actively strive for and succeed in acquiring combat positions, 
then the Army Chief of Staff and Marine Commandant, as purported by Barry (2013), 
will have to assess the “largely unquantifiable risk” that low-level leadership in combat 
will become more difficult, and military effectiveness will diminish as a result (p. 28).  
Egnell (2013) took issue with how military effectiveness is measured and pointed to two 
problems.  First, treating military effectiveness as success on the battlefield separates the 
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political aspect of war.  Second, the overemphasis on physical factors distracts attention 
away from the intangible assets that influence effective use of resources (Egnell, 2013, p. 
36).  In addition, Seipel (2010) mentioned that women’s increasing involvement in 
policy-making has influenced how states allocate resources.  Dietz (2011) argued that 
exclusion erodes effectiveness and deprives the military of leadership capabilities of 
qualified females.  Epstein et al. (2013) concluded that “there is no direct evidence that 
women have a negative impact on combat effectiveness” (p. 2673).  Haring (2013) 
implored that it is not about all women be equal to all  men in physical capacity, but 
rather simply letting women who can meet the physical standards serve as infantry.  
Nonetheless, as briefly acknowledged by Maginnis (2013), female soldiers are at 
substantial risk in association with this form of equal opportunity.   
 Overall, proponents who pushed for women in combat may not actually 
understand the realities of fighting capabilities or the threat it poses for women and the 
men they work with (Epstein et al., 2013; Maginnis, 2013; Maguen et al., 2012).  
Deadlines are now looming for top military commanders to either have a clear path for 
eliminating all gender restrictions or provide good reason for requesting a waiver from 
the policy (Tilghman, 2015).   
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this organizational case study was to examine the potential 
challenges and/or successes in implementing the new inclusion policy.  A chief reason 
organizational culture is popularly studied is to determine if correlation exists between 
organizational culture and organizational performance (Berrio, 2003).  A brigade element 
of traditionally all-male combat units provided the context for the study by examining 
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internal preparations and their perceptions on integrating women into the combat culture.  
Despite media speculation, Barry (2013) claimed that Panetta and Dempsey’s decision is 
more conditional than what has been reported.  The Pentagon may still exclude women 
from certain combat roles, the possibility of which is greater with U.S. Army and Marine 
infantry units (Barry, 2013).  The Marine Corp and the U.S. Army have taken different 
approaches to opening combat roles to women (Lin, 2014).  Combat engineer positions in 
the army and ground intelligence positions in the marines have thus far been opened to 
women (Tilghman, 2015).  Tilghman (2015) noted “in total, about 91,000 previously 
male-only jobs have been opened to women over the past few years. Across the active 
and reserve forces, about 240,000 jobs remain closed, mainly in infantry and armor units” 
(para. 8).  Although research related to marine experiences is referenced periodically, the 
main focus is on providing a snapshot of the Army experience.  Although I sought to 
shed some light on any continued combat exclusion, the intent is to produce a better 
understanding of the organizational climate in the midst of significant organizational 
change and contribute to an emerging body of research on the subject at hand.  King 
(2013) speculated that the culture is unlikely to alter regardless of the formal lifting of 
gender restrictions.  Modes of operation, strategy, and goals are all influenced by cultural 
elements of an organization (Schein, 1985).   
   Remembering that frames represent perceptions and beliefs, another goal of 
studying organizational culture is to discover and “interpret aspects of organizational life 
so that we can better understand perceptions, beliefs, and actions of organizational 
members” (Martin et al., 1997, p. 3).  Organizational culture assists colleagues in 
working through basic internal problems so that survivability and adaptability are 
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developed toward the external environment or external threats.  Framing women as 
equally capable combatants in our armed forces does not mean that enemy combatants 
will recognize fair treatment or change their tactics (Maginnis, 2013).  It would be 
beneficial for a long-term analysis to track the progression of the transition the Army is 
undergoing to determine if the organizational change efforts result in improved 
organizational performance and effectiveness.     
Research Questions 
 RQ1 - How is the integration of women into combat roles perceived with regards 
to the strength and survivability of the unit? 
 RQ2 – How do male and female officers perceive the effect that America’s future 
military conflicts will have on women assigned to ground combat operations? 
Nature of the Study 
 The nature of this study was a qualitative case study.  As previously mentioned, 
select combat units from a brigade element represent the units of analysis to provide a 
microcosm of a broader structure.  I collected qualitative data was primarily through in-
depth semi-structured interviews with commanding officers of field artillery and infantry 
units.  Because combat units are at the forefront of the new policy, I want to report what 
internal preparations are being conducted, including how physical standards are going to 
factor into the implementation.  In addition, female officers serving in combat support 
units were interviewed to gain their perspective and attempt to find evidence if women 
are actively seeking direct combat positions.  The qualitative inquiry of officers should 
provide more insight on the changes that have to occur within the combat units to 
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successfully facilitate the policy and to determine if conflicting frames exist between 
commands. 
Conceptual Framework 
 The conceptual framework for this study is the frame-critical approach which is 
an approach to policy making developed by Schön and Rein (1994).  These authors 
distinguished between policy disagreements and policy controversies.  Policy 
disagreement refers to debates over issues that are able to be resolved when contending 
parties examine the facts of the situation and agree which facts are relevant.  In contrast, 
policy controversies “are immune to resolution by appeal to facts” (Schön & Rein, 1994, 
p. 4).  The distinctions are conceptually clear; however, it may not be clear which type of 
dispute is in question.  Policy controversies emerge when opposing parties hold 
conflicting frames.  Schön and Rein (1994) defined the concept of frames as “structures 
of belief, perception, and appreciation” on which policy positions rest (p. 23).   
 Opening direct combat roles to women has initially been framed as an equal 
opportunity issue.  Frames have normative implications which imply a certain type of 
solution.  Normative standards have to be distinguished from actuality.  Schön and Rein 
explained that “often, a disagreement about the ‘facts’ turns out to mask an underlying 
controversy,” and straightforward questions “may be difficult or impossible to answer by 
recourse to empirical investigation alone” (p. 4).  Empirical questions pertain to what 
happened and why.  Empirical assumptions may explain why direct combat has been 
open to women, but normative judgment focuses on the soundness of the policy.  It is the 
cultural frames or the culturally-shared belief systems of combat units that have been 
subject to scrutiny by proponents of women in combat (Egnell, 2013; Farnell, 2009).   
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Significance of the Study 
 This study is significant in that the rescindment of the Aspin Rule requires 
significant organizational change for direct combat units.  A review of relevant literature 
outlined the policy controversy, but now the policy is official.  The Army Chief of Staff, 
General Raymond Odierno, acknowledged that the army’s greatest challenge is providing 
steadfast support in worldwide operations while simultaneously drawing down the size of 
the armed forces under a stringent fiscal environment (Troxell, 2014).  Each year, the 
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes a key strategic issues 
list (KSIL) to make researchers aware of topics that are of special interest to the Army.  
Part I of the 2014/15 KSIL is dedicated to army priorities for strategic analysis (APSA).  
Assessing the growing role of women in the military is just one of the several topics of 
inquiry.  Furthermore, based on the APSA, the Army wants to know how it should adapt 
its training and activities to serve as a catalyst for change in support of Force 2025 and 
Beyond.  Force 2025 and Beyond is an emerging framework designed to align the army’s 
strategic priorities with the demands of the future geopolitical environment (Townsend & 
Chaney, 2014).  The three primary efforts of Force 2025 consist of force employment, 
force design, and science and technology and human performance optimization.  Aptly 
named, the goal is to produce a leaner, smarter, more lethal and flexible force by 2025 
and create the conditions for long-term fundamental change.  Accordingly, the 
knowledge obtained from the study is to produce a better understanding of the internal 
preparations of an army organization, taking account if women can achieve and maintain 
the physical standards for combat and how future military operations will govern 
decisions about sending women into combat.   
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 Assigning women to combat represents social change of enormous magnitude.  
Examining how and why this monumental change occurred has led to the need for further 
research into the relationship between gender and the military and the changing nature of 
war (Percy, 2013).  Veteran combat commanders who have fought and/or know the 
realities of war can offer better perspective on what is best for an effectively functioning 
unit.  The potential for unintended and unforeseen consequences is not uncommon in 
public policy issues.  As such, the welfare of new female recruits needs serious 
consideration.  Female empowerment may be a positive accomplishment to come from 
the experience.  Testimony from members of FETs, while acknowledging challenges 
associated with mixed-gender units, recalls comradeship with male counterparts as a 
positive experience (Holmstedt, 2007; King, 2013; Williams & Schaub, 2006).   
 If the goal of the new inclusion policy is to create a gender-neutral military, then 
it is important to know if this study can identify factors that will facilitate successful 
gender integration including physiological and psychological mediation.  Women serving 
in combat support jobs in warzones already share many risks with their male colleagues.  
Opening direct combat to women may subject them to greater additional risks.  Not all 
combat aftermath is equally experienced between men and women returning from 
deployments (Maguen et al., 2012).  It is not yet clear what role sexual assault and other 
traumatic experiences are having in the increase in female veteran suicide rates 
(Zarembo, 2015).  Nevertheless, for the army to serve as a catalyst for positive social 
change, it needs to have a plan on how to reduce those numbers as the organization 
undergoes this transition.   
Assumptions, Delimitations, and Limitations 
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 Civilian control of the military and the sensitive nature of the issue can influence 
obedience.  For purposes of the study, I assumed that the commanding officers respond 
honestly about assigning women into combat units including any potential positive or 
negative effects on operational readiness and the safety and morale of their subordinates.  
Confidentiality is provided to all the participants, including their rank and units of 
command.  In no way is the institution to suffer any repercussion for participating.  The 
study was confined to interviewing commanders (brigade, battalion, battery and 
company) of a local combat brigade and some combat support (for purposes of attaining 
female participation).  In addition, I limited the study to 13 participants to be further 
explained in the methodology section.  The combat units are purposely sampled because 
the inclusion policy directly applies to them.  The confined locations limit the 
generalization of the results among the broader armed forces.  Furthermore, the absence 
of enlisted personnel perspective (measuring attitudes) prevents a deeper account of the 
organizational climate as the organization undergoes significant change. 
Summary 
 The nature of modern combat has led to new policy regarding women’s roles in 
ground combat.  I examined the perspectives of commanding officers composing an army 
combat brigade as they undergo preparation for the integration of women into infantry 
and field artillery. In addition, the positive or negative impact on culture and structure of 
combat organizations is yet to be fully determined.  In Chapter 2, I review relevant 
literature that outlines the progression of the policy controversy and the conflicting 
frames associated with both advocates and opponents of women in combat.     
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
Introduction 
The inclusion of women into ground combat roles has been one of the most highly 
contested and debated policies of the U.S. armed forces (Farnell, 2009).  The rescindment 
of the exclusion policy represents a new transition for ground combat units, and more 
research needs to be conducted regarding the implementation efforts.  The purpose of this 
qualitative case study was to examine the internal preparations of a local combat brigade 
undergoing the implementation process.  Perspectives from command leadership should 
help shed light on any challenges or successes they are experiencing with opening 
combat roles to women.  The 2013 decision to remove gender restrictions on combat is 
still considered controversial (King, 2013).  A review of relevant literature constructs the 
frame, as defined by Schön and Rein (1994), for the underlying controversy over 
assigning women to direct ground combat.     
Maginnis (2013) provided the most comprehensive account of how the United 
States reached this milestone, the cultural myths surrounding the debate, the risks 
associated with putting women and combat, and what should be done.  Maginnis put forth 
that feminists succeeded in framing the argument in the ideological terms of equality.  
Egnell (2013) addressed two assumptions related to the controversy - that women are not 
fit for war due to physical incapability or mental fitness, and that women will change the 
organizational (combat) culture of the military to reflect civilian rather than military 
character (p. 33).  Correspondingly, Egnell considered those assumptions to be flawed.  
Simons (2000) contended that common sense was being lost in the argument with regard 
to the purposes and functions of the military – deterrence and winning wars – and the 
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foreseeable consequences of mixing men and women together – (i.e., sexual 
impropriety).  Simons (2000) explained: 
Rather than regarding these predictable outcomes as unalterable realities, 
however, those who advocate lifting the ban point to a long American 
tradition of being able to amend behaviors, beliefs, and ideals.  Culture, so 
far as they are concerned, can be changed. . . (pp. 451–452). 
Indeed, Farnell (2009), an integration advocate, suggested that more energy and research 
be directed toward changing military culture.  Owing to minimal statistical data produced 
about combat culture and why culture was not fully addressed in the debate, Farnell 
insisted that policy change alone would not suffice and that a cultural war needed to be 
won to guarantee women’s ascent into the highest ranks.  Egnell (2013) perceived the 
inclusion of women in combat units as an “opportunity to revise the culture and structure 
of the armed forces” (p. 34).  Several years before the landmark announcement, Simons 
(2001) anticipated that equal opportunity to serve, reconsideration of unit cohesion, and 
foreign military case studies would be motivating arguments used in favor of lifting the 
combat exclusion rule in the United States.   
 The first section of this literature review discusses the frame-critical approach to 
policy making as the conceptual framework and how it pertains to the issue of women in 
combat.  The second section describes the ‘equal opportunity’ arguments.  The third 
section depicts the issue of unit cohesion.  The fourth section discusses the physiology 
and psychology related to direct ground combat.  The fifth section provides reference to 
women’s service in foreign militaries.  The EBSCO host research databases accessed for 
use in the literature review included Academic Search Complete, ProQuest, Political 
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Science Complete, Military & Government Collection, and PsycArticles.  In addition, 
bibliographical sources contained in published books and journal articles related to the 
research topic were consulted.  I also used the search engine Google Scholar.  The key 
words or phrases searched included:  women in combat; women at war; war and gender; 
military sexual trauma; and military organizational culture.   
The Frame-Critical Approach 
Schön and Rein (1994) introduced the frame-critical approach as a conceptual 
framework to explore policy controversies.  Frames represent assumptions and 
perceptions that subsequently shape policy positions.  Schön and Rein explained that the 
struggles between contending parties over the framing of a policy situation are “symbolic 
contests over the social meaning of an issue domain” (p. 29).  Consequently, the social 
meaning entails what the issue is and what is to be done.  More specifically, Schön and 
Rein referred to culturally shared belief systems as “metacultural frames” (p. 33).  As 
noted in Chapter 1, the military combat culture has been a part of the controversy over 
assigning women to combat.   
Although frames and interests are independent concepts, interests are shaped by 
frames, and frames may be used to promote interests (Schön & Rein, 1994).  One party 
may hold evidence considered damaging to the opposing party’s argument, but the 
opposing party may dismiss the evidence as “irrelevant or innocuous,” or modify the 
argument so as to incorporate the new evidence (Schön & Rein, 1994, p. 30).  Different 
views of reality fit the metacultural frame constructed for a given situation.  Hence, the 
problem formulation and preferred solutions are grounded in different problem-setting 
stories rooted in different frames (Schön & Rein, 1994).  Quantitative data between the 
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genders, between civilian and military personnel, and qualitative interviews about 
women’s experiences in war provide perspective that has shaped public consciousness 
about the issue of women in combat.  Schön and Rein (1994) also pointed out that 
“versions of particular metacultural frames clearly tend to be associated with traditional 
political-economic perspectives” (p. 34).  Frames serve rhetorical function for purposes 
of persuasion and justification in policy debate.  The following sections delineate the 
adversarial positions between opponents and proponents of the women in combat policy 
dispute.  
Equal Opportunity to Serve 
  Fair treatment for all individuals is a worthy goal, and no American should be 
discriminated against.  Seipel (2010) reviewed a growing body of literature about 
women’s increasing participation in government and public policy.  The number of 
American women serving in political office has grown steadily over several years 
(Seipel, 2010).  The fairness or equality perspective decrees that women be granted the 
same opportunities as men when it comes to fulfilling their citizenship duties, including 
military service (Simons, 2001).  In other words, for women to be equal societal partners, 
they must bear equal responsibility for national defense.  “This notion of equality is based 
on the flawed assumption that we all have the ability to do the same things” (Maginnis, 
2013, p. 49).  Even after the abolition of the draft, the male-only Selective Service 
Registration was challenged as a violation of equal protection by male plaintiffs in the 
1981 court case Rostker v. Goldberg.  The Supreme Court upheld the Selective Service 
exemption of female conscripts because the law’s purpose was to maintain a pool of 
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potential combat troops should the draft ever be reinstated (Rostker v Goldberg, 453 U.S. 
57, 1981).   
The Rostker decision reflected military policy of that time, which still excluded 
women from combat.  Military policies have since changed during that decision, and as 
long as the current combat inclusion law stands, the Supreme Court will eventually have 
revisit the issue and require female registration for the draft (Maginnis, 2013).  If bearing 
equal responsibility is a valid argument, then proponents would have to advocate for 
national conscription (Simons, 2001).  Norway, for example, has roughly 8,000 
conscripted soldiers, but those conscripts may only fulfill homeland security duties (Syse, 
2013).  The U.S. military is an all-volunteer force.  Every American is not required to 
serve, and every volunteer does not have to be accepted.  Furthermore, the military has 
strict medical standards that disqualify many people, but those exclusions are intended to 
protect operational readiness and to save taxpayers unnecessary medical costs (Maginnis, 
2013).   
In November 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union sued the Pentagon over 
combat exclusion of women, and only two months later the ban was officially lifted.  
Prior to the decision, Dietz (2011), a Judge Advocate officer, wrote a review dedicated to 
the legality of the exclusion policy.  According to Dietz (2011), regardless of the social or 
political reasons for exclusion, the policy had to comply with the Equal Protection Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution.  The framework for Dietz’s law review consisted of a 1996 
Supreme Court case that ruled against the Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI) exclusion 
of women and data collected since 2001 regarding women’s experience in combat zones.  
Performance data of women serving honorably in Iraq and Afghanistan purportedly 
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undermined any justifications for exclusion (Dietz, 2011).  In addition, Dietz mentioned 
the 2010 repeal of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT)’.  That repeal was significant in terms 
of organizational change, and likewise should offer new perspective regarding gender 
integration.  Subsequently, Dietz declared that the exclusion policy violated the 
Constitution’s equal protection clause.        
Haring (2013), a U.S. Army Reserve Colonel, cited studies from the Catalyst 
Knowledge Center and Naissance Capital revealing the positive connection between 
organizational success and the gender diversity of those organizations.  Accordingly, 
companies with the most women board of directors performed better in financial 
management and quality of decision-making.  In this instance, however, the author was 
drawing a false dichotomy between the corporate sector and the military.  Or as Simons 
(2001) noted, “combat is not a workplace” (p. 92).  Nonetheless, Haring was explaining 
how the military would be strengthened by allowing women to serve at all levels.  Haring 
cited Woolley & Malone (2011) about increasing “collective intelligence” and more 
evenly shared “communication distribution patterns” in association with a greater 
percentage of women in a group (p. 28).   
In recent years, Seipel (2010) suggested that the increasing number of women in 
political, managerial, and decision-making positions has made a significant difference 
and offered recommendations to “fully involve women in top decision-making roles” (p. 
350).  Contemporary battlefield environments will certainly involve changing dynamics 
and uncertainty.  It is the improved scope and quality of decision-making that Haring 
viewed as a major benefit, which is why women needed to be afforded the opportunity to 
compete for the highest officer positions – to allow for better executive level decisions (p. 
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32).  Farnell (2009) agreed that the exclusion rule was the main barrier to women 
attaining the top promotions.  As a nonprofit think-tank, the RAND Corporation conducts 
many studies at the request of the DOD.  However, RAND researchers found no 
statistically significant link between occupational restrictions and differences in female 
officers’ rates of retention and promotion (Asch, Miller, & Malchiodi, 2012).  Based on 
that study, Maginnis (2013) claimed that the promotion argument is dishonest.  
Furthermore, while women compose about 15% of the total active force, they account for 
nearly 18% of all junior officers, 13% of officers from major to colonel, and almost 6% 
of general and flag officers.  In addition, women were less likely to join the military and 
more likely to depart early (Asch, Miller, & Malchiodi, 2012).  The Canadian experience 
offers perspective in this regard.  When gender restrictions were removed in the Canadian 
Forces (CF), the percentage of women in combat roles rose from 0.3% to 3.8% over a 12 
year period (Barry, 2013).  That percentage has remained about the same since.  
However, the attrition rate for women in the CF combat units is 11% higher than the men.  
The primary reason seemed to be that women prioritized family life over the military 
(UK Defence Science & Technology Laboratory, 2009; Barry, 2013).   
Even if or after total female integration is achieved, King (2013) predicted that 
female participation in the U.S. military is unlikely to surpass the 15 percent marker.  
This suggests that the Department of Defense (DOD) should conduct further research 
before declaring combat exclusion as an obstacle to female retention (Maginnis, 2013).  
Studies conducted by the RAND Corporation have been used on both sides of the debate.  
For example, a 1997 RAND study concluded that the gender integration had a relatively 
small effect on readiness, morale, and cohesion within units where certain specialties 
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were previously closed to women (Farnell, 2009; McNulty, 2012).  While intangible 
elements like morale and cohesion are part of the frame conflict, so too is the physical 
debate.   
The army physical fitness test (APFT) has served as a practical gauge for 
determining the general physical well-being of recruits entering service as well as present 
active personnel.  The U.S. Army maintains a ‘separate but equal’ APFT for females 
which is less demanding in relative terms than the male requirements (Maginnis, 2013).  
Dietz (2011) challenged opponents’ employment of APFT data as justification for 
denying women entry in combat units.  For instance, data from a 2011 West Point class 
revealed that 52% of third-year female cadets passed the physical requirements 
demanded of a 17 year old male (Dietz, 2011).  Age is factored into minimum 
qualification on the APFT.  A 40-year-old male is not held to the same standard as a 17-
year-old male.  Age-normed standards thus allow for fluctuating physical performance 
based on age, not occupational requirements (Haring, 2013).  In 2006, the Army raised 
the maximum recruitment age from 35 to 42.  Dietz pointed out that if a 42 year old male 
is presumed physically capable for infantry, then the minimum physical standard to 
which he is held on the APFT should be no different for the female soldier.  Similarly, 
“evidence that women held to one standard failed to meet an unknown higher standard is 
unpersuasive justification for exclusion” (Dietz, 2011, p. 137).  Nevertheless, the APFT 
still represents an example of gender-normed standards.  A female is rewarded the same 
physical fitness score as a male of the same age who runs two miles two minutes faster 
(Maginnis, 2013).   
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In 1976, when women first enrolled in the service academies like West Point, it 
was expected that they would perform equally to the men (Schloesser, 2010).  However, 
due to physiological differences, the standards proved too difficult for female cadets.  
Consequently, the standards changed to reflect gender differences and to promote 
diversity goals.  The embarrassment the U.S. Navy suffered as a result of the Tailhook 
Scandal led some political leaders to demand that the navy accept more women into naval 
combat aviation (Maginnis, 2013).  At first, the navy lowered its standards to 
accommodate the demand, and a report from the Center for Military Readiness concluded 
that the first woman, Lieutenant Kara Hultgreen, qualified as an F-14 pilot because of 
compromised flight training owing to her gender (Belz, 1995).  Tragically, Lt. Hultgreen 
was killed in 1994 when losing control of her jet while attempting to land on an aircraft 
carrier (Maginnis, 2013).  The navy corrected course by raising its standards, but it came 
at a terrible cost.  With ground combat units, the “diversity metrics” summarized in the 
2011 Report of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission are driving the policy 
change without regard to military readiness (Maginnis, 2013; Military Leadership 
Diversity Commission, 2011; Thompson, 2013).           
In 2012, the Marine Corps recruited female volunteers for the infantry officer 
course at Quantico as part of a broader effort to assess their performance (Dao, 2013).  
The grueling 13-week course would hopefully serve as an indicator of women’s 
suitability to combat (Egnell, 2013).  Of two eligible women recruited, one dropped out 
the first day; the other left two weeks later due to medical reasons (Wong, 2012).  The 
same scenario in March 2013 produced the same outcome (Maginnis, 2013).  In early 
2014, the Marine Corps had to suspend its female fitness plan when nearly half of the 
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female recruits failed to pass (Associated Press, 2014).  On the one hand, the physical 
fitness tests don’t necessarily correspond to actuality of tasks or combat requirements.  In 
addition, Farnell (2009) suggested that disqualification not be reduced to physical 
strength alone.  Nonetheless, physical fitness tests still serve as useful indicators of 
general health, and the failures experienced in the Marine Corps indicate that more 
female volunteers will be difficult to find unless the standards change (Maginnis, 2013).  
A significant question remains:  how will physical standards factor into the 
implementation of the new inclusion policy?  King (2013) asserted: 
Even women who are strong enough to serve in combat present a problem 
because the armed forces, focused on war-winning (not employment 
equality), are unable to apply gender-blind standards to women; they 
cannot treat them equally and tend to be too lenient (p. 14). 
Haring (2013) briefly pointed to Denmark as a foreign case study to examine 
where women serve in combat units.  Denmark began testing gender integration during 
the 1980s.  However, after a majority of the female test population resigned due to 
physical difficulties, Denmark altered its physical standards in order to admit women into 
combat roles (Dietz, 2011).  The U.S. military has already tried gender-blind standards 
when attempting to match capabilities with job assignments, but that approach was 
abandoned because too many candidates were eliminated (Force System Directorate, 
1985; Maginnis, 2013; United States General Accounting Office, 1996).  Although 
concern exists that standards would be lowered to accommodate women, the commander 
of the marine infantry officer school said that would never happen and that the standards 
are already gender-neutral (Dao, 2013; Egnell, 2013).  The army plans on opening 
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assignments first to qualified women while developing standards for the closed military 
occupational specialties [MOSs] (Lin, 2014).  The marine plan, on the other hand, “is to 
come up with standards first and then decide whether to open closed MOSs” (Lin, 2014, 
para. 19).  It is not yet known if the variation in the plans will be a source of contention 
between the two branches (Lin, 2014).   
Combat is a level of intenseness unlike any other occupation (Simons, 2001).  
Equal opportunity to serve must include opportunity to fail.  Whether women can achieve 
and maintain the physical standards for combat has to be determined.  Women can legally 
demand equivalent opportunities, but they would have to know from the onset that they 
could be rejected from certain military specialties (Simons, 2001).  The Pentagon has 
already utilized gender-norming for years to reward equivalent effort rather than equal 
results, which has produced the current physical fitness double standards (Maginnis, 
2013).  More importantly, the battlefield is an unforgiving environment where 
performance results are a life and death matter.   
Barry (2013) mentioned that the Pentagon could still recommend that women be 
excluded from certain occupational (combat) specialties.  Those positions would most 
likely apply to elite infantry outfits.  At a 2014 Washington briefing, Colonel Haring 
criticized the U.S. Army Ranger School for remaining closed to women (Lin, 2014).  
According to Haring, “continuing to exclude women from accessing this elite leadership 
school makes it appear that the army is not confident in women’s leadership or combat 
service potential” (Lin, 2014, para. 16).  By the Fall of 2014, 31 women were chosen to 
be observers and advisors at the ranger school as a first step in preparation for integrated 
classes (Tan, 2015).  When examining the Israeli forces, Epstein et al. (2013) contended 
29 
 
 
 
that while integrating females into combat units is possible, some combat occupations 
(elite infantry equivalents to U.S. Special Forces and Navy SEALs) would remain 
restricted due to the extreme physical requirements and high probability of direct enemy 
engagement.   
The burden of proof still falls on the U.S. service branch commanders to provide 
reasonable explanation for exclusion rather than senior echelons explaining why the 
standards have to be changed (Barry, 2013; Maginnis, 2013).  Any exceptions have to 
undergo thorough analysis based on all factual data related to the competencies and 
capabilities for the position and are subject to approval by the defense secretary (Barry, 
2013).  Simons (2001) surmised that the placing women in direct combat has less to do 
with rights and responsibilities and more to do with rewards.  Career advancement is a 
reasonable goal, but “if the aim was truly parity and opportunity, women could 
accomplish both equally in their own single-gender combat units” (Simons, 2001, p. 90).  
Lobbying for all-female units has not happened.  Predictive evidence of women’s ability 
to perform physically may be acquired by examining their performance in combat 
support units in Iraq and Afghanistan (Dietz, 2011; Haring, 2013).  However, beyond the 
physicality aspect, there is also the cultural aspect.        
Unit Cohesion 
 The basis of cohesion has produced some of the most heated debate among 
scholars (King, 2013).  Kingsley Browne’s work Co-ed Combat: The New Evidence That 
Women  Shouldn’t Fight the Nation’s Wars has been referenced in regards to women 
undermining the cohesiveness of all-male groups (King, 2013, p. 13).  Simons (2000) 
said that “cohesion should be the most serious obstacle to gender integration precisely 
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because no structure can guarantee it” (p. 452).  The British Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
released results of its own study that concluded that while women can meet infantry 
requirements, the presence of women in combat units may be detrimental to unit cohesion 
(Barry, 2013; Dietz, 2011; U.K. MoD, 2010).  Some commentary suggested that erosion 
of unit cohesion is chief among the misguided assumptions associated with integrating 
women into combat units (Egnell, 2013; Haring, 2013).   
Historically, masculinity has been the dominant feature of military culture and a 
principal factor in cohesion and combat motivation (Tarrasch et al., 2011; King, 2013).  
Cockburn (2013) presented numerous examples of masculinity being embedded in 
various cultures concerning militarism and nationalism.  Combat training shapes men 
(masculinity) for the expressed purpose of the disciplined violence of war (Cockburn, 
2013).  Maginnis (2013) explained that the masculine mindset is the glue that holds 
soldiers together and fuels the aggression needed against the enemy; the feminization of 
ground combat threatens to damage that warrior ethos.  Simons (2001) noted that, 
although unintentional, women inevitably “alter the chemistry in all-male groups” (p. 96).  
Because human bonding is not quantifiable, Simons (2000) argued that it is largely 
ignored as the “glue” holding units together (p. 452).  Tarrasch et al. (2011) explained 
that integrating women into combat roles may be perceived as a “dangerous blow” to the 
existing social order (p. 306).    
Social scientists attempt to measure cohesion by means of observing group 
performance of various tasks or inquiring group members to assess their own sense of 
attachment to their units and the perceived strength and performance of those units 
(Johns, 1984; Harrell & Miller, 1997; Mangelsdorff, 1999; Rosen et al., 1999; Simons, 
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2001).  The RAND Corporation produced a broad review on studies related to the topic 
of unit cohesion (RAND, 2010).  In general, the review focused on two differentiations:  
social and task cohesion (Haring, 2013).  Some sources have stressed the importance of 
social cohesion in relation to the close bonds of friendship forged among soldiers 
(Siebold, 2007; Siebold & Kelly, 1988; Wong, 2003).  The advocacy argument maintains 
that “cohesion does not require that soldiers bond socially, only that they accomplish 
their tasks effectively” (Simons, 2001, p. 89).  In other words, competence matters more 
than personable likeability.  In combat, King (2013) discovered accounts from soldiers 
that understand their roles as such – that solidarity depends on goal accomplishment, not 
friendship (p. 15).  Haring (2013) reported that women serving in aviation units, “with no 
degradation in unit performance”, is evidence that unit cohesion is not dependent on 
demographic features such as gender (p. 30).  However, air combat stills need to be 
differentiated from ground combat.   
King explained that the growth of professionalism is of great consequence for 
military culture itself and particularly for cohesion at a group level.  King explored the 
phenomenon of “professionalized cohesion” based on experiences of the Israeli Defense 
Forces [IDF] (p. 16).  Essentially, “IDF soldiers relied on swift trust to generate 
cohesion” when their units were reassembled or merged based on mission requirements 
and troop availability (King, 2013, p. 16).  Competence in task execution seemed as 
effective in developing cohesion when compared to social cohesion developed over long-
term bonding (Ben-Ari, 2010; King, 2013).  Epstein et al. (2013) confirmed that the IDF 
experience indicates that cohesion is preserved in gender-integrated combat units.  King 
noted that professional cohesion may be crucial to the integration of women into the 
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infantry.  King concluded that “gender barriers appear to be breaking down…and women 
are increasingly accepted by the infantry on the grounds of their performance” (p. 19).  
Haring expressed that more emphasis should be placed on task cohesion as it relates to 
group performance, and that some studies show correlation between high social cohesion 
and negative group behaviors.  Haring (2013) cited an event like the Tailhook incident as 
an illustration of “excessive social cohesion that reinforced negative group behaviors” (p. 
30).  MacKenzie (2013) reinforced Haring’s view by pointing to military nadirs over the 
past decade – including the travesty at Abu Ghraib, record suicide rates, and the sexual 
assault epidemic – all which highlight the negative aspects of group cohesion.   
Along similar discussion to task and social cohesion, the shift to an all-volunteer 
force, as observed by many scholars, reformed civil-military relations (King, 2013).  In 
referencing frames, as introduced by Schon and Rein (1994), it is important to remember 
that frames have normative implications.  Egnell (2013) mentioned that the purpose of 
civil-military relations theory tends to be normative.  Egnell regarded the field of civil-
military relations theory as an insightful source in the integration debate.  The foundation 
of the theory rests on the assumption that military organizations are shaped by two forces:  
a functional and a societal imperative.  The functional imperative stems from security 
threats, and the societal imperative is rooted in ideologies and social and institutional 
forces (Egnell, 2013).  Some theorists have emphasized the societal imperative over the 
functional – civilian control takes precedence over military effectiveness (Boene, 1990; 
Egnell, 2013).  Referencing the cultural gap between civilians and the military, Hillen 
(2002) wrote: 
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If the purpose of having military establishment in the first place is to 
promote cozy civil-military relations, then military culture should be 
forcibly brought into line with civilian culture.  If however, the purpose of 
having a military is to provide for the common defense, then the military 
must nurture the unique culture developed for that purpose. (pp. 168–169). 
Some scholars suggest striking balance between the imperatives, while others propose 
that the goal shouldn’t be about reaching a middle-ground but rather to seek synergy 
between them (Dandeker, 2003; Egnell, 2013; Janowitz, 1960).   
According to Egnell (2013), one’s perspective concerning the functional or 
societal imperative leads to fear and rejection based on flawed assumptions.  Egnell 
explained that gender integration in combat does not fit the traditional interpretation of 
the functional imperative; instead, it is seen as the “politically imposed societal 
imperative” (p. 39).  Similarly, Winslow and Dunn (2002) noted that laws and rulings 
from civilian sources resulted in “externally imposed change” with the opening of combat 
positions to women in the CF (p. 654).  Comparable to Dietz (2011), Winslow and Dunn 
examined the legal standard of incorporating men and women as equals in the CF, but the 
researchers also examined the social nature of integration as having more extensive 
implications than the legality issue.  Social attitudes may not be in alignment with the 
laws or evolve more slowly than the laws. 
King (2013) claimed that there is still substantial evidence that many soldiers are 
opposed to female presence in combat, and that “everyday attitudes of male soldiers are 
likely to be more important in undermining female integration” (p. 21).  Matthews et al. 
(2009) sought to compare the attitudes of male and female West Point cadets, Reserved 
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Officer Training Corp (ROTC) candidates and non-military affiliated college students 
with respect to attitudes about women serving in nine different military positions.  
Matthews et al. mentioned that “historical biases and stereotypes” are reflected in the 
ongoing social attitudes toward expanding military roles for women (p. 242).  The 
volunteer sample included 509 ROTC candidates (384 male, 125 female), 218 West Point 
cadets (184 male, 34 female), and 598 civilian college students (264 male, 334 female).  
The authors hypothesized that cadets would be less supportive than civilians, and that 
men would be less approving than women (Matthews et al., 2009, p. 244).  Women by 
law were still banned from direct combat during this study, which made it a category of 
particular interest.  The overall results indicated approval of women serving in diverse 
roles.  However, the researchers’ hypothesis was supported when applied to the category 
of women in direct combat; it held the lowest approval among the nine total.  The authors 
recommended further research into perceptions, stereotypes and tensions regarding 
gender in the military and their direct and indirect implications.  Matthews et al. (2009) 
concluded that social attitudes may ultimately impact the inclination of women to 
volunteer for any type of military service.   
After combat inclusion became official, Young and Nauta (2013) produced a 
quantitative study expanding on the aforementioned research.  Young and Nauta wanted 
to examine if “differences in attitudes toward women in the military held by military-
affiliated and civilian individuals are attributable to differences in sexism” which in turn 
was the basis of their hypothesis (pp. 166–167).  The researchers described differences 
between four types of sexism: old-fashioned sexism, modern sexism, benevolent sexism, 
and hostile sexism.  The authors purported that associations between the benevolent and  
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hostile concepts and attitudes about women in the military haven’t been investigated.  
Hostile sexism was defined as expressed anger based on a woman’s refusal of a man’s 
advancements; benevolent sexism stems from prosocial beliefs that women should be 
protected (Young & Nauta, 2013).  According to the authors, benevolent sexism, 
although viewed as compassionate, would produce a negative view about women in 
combat because such a role violates the perception of how women should be treated.  The 
researchers anticipated that each level of sexism would make a distinctive contribution to 
prediction of attitudes.  The research site consisted only of a medium-sized public 
university in the mid-West with a volunteer sample of 316 students.  Of that population, 
only 62 students had some type of military affiliation – ROTC, active duty, or veteran.  
The results revealed that all forms of sexism produced negative connotations about 
women in the military and in combat, and each sexism category provided an independent 
contribution.  However, when women serving in combat was the only criteria, benevolent 
sexism was a non-significant predictor of attitudes.  Ultimately, the researchers 
concluded that sexism appeared to fully account for negative attitudes held by military-
affiliated students and their views on women serving in combat.   
Young and Nauta (2013) admitted that their results have to be “tempered” given 
that only a single institution was surveyed, and it shouldn’t be assumed that the results 
can be generalized to all military personnel (p. 170).  In terms of application, Young and 
Nauta suggested that opening combat roles to women may actually reverse negative 
perceptions.  Documented intergroup contact (between men and women) has shown 
reduction in prejudice, and might likewise increase favorable attitudes in military males 
as female participation increases (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011; Young & Nauta, 2013).  
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King (2013) pointed out that a similar reform in attitudes is emerging among elite 
infantry groups like the British Royal Marines and Parachute Regiment (p. 19).  General 
Dempsey observed that the introduction of women into West Point had made it a better 
place (Barry, 2013).  Furthermore, Dempsey claimed that assigning women to combat 
units would mitigate sexual harassment and assault, a response which Maginnis (2013) 
called an “illogical assertion” (p. 31).  Sexual tension remains one of the most corrosive 
issues to the unit cohesion controversy.   
Dietz (2011) contended that mixed-gender units have successfully overcome 
issues of sexual tension and misconduct as a result of good leadership and discipline (p. 
120).  Maginnis refuted the idea that effective leadership defeats sexual indiscretion.  For 
instance, the Associated Press reported that 30% of commanders were fired between 
2005 and 2013 because of sexual-related offenses (Baldor, 2013).  From pregnancy rates 
aboard navy vessels, to testimony from deployed aviation and army leaders and 
subordinates, the best chain-of-commands could not stop the sexual excursions (Coalition 
of Sailors Against Destructive Decisions, 2013; Maginnis, 2013).  Soldiers assume high 
levels of trust, and such inappropriate sexual relationships “destroy service members’ 
confidence in one another and in their leaders” (Maginnis, 2013, p. 71).  Simons (2001) 
mentioned that the potential alone for sexual impropriety is enough to create a toxic 
environment because “conjecture breeds doubt, doubt suspicion, suspicion mistrust” (p. 
99).  Soldiers train together with the expectation that they will deploy together.  
Pregnancy, accidental or not, requires a woman be removed from duty which likewise 
affects military readiness.  No  alternate physical comparison renders men non-
deployable (Simons, 2001).  Lastly, minus improper consensual fraternization, the 
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military still has a problem dealing with sexual assault.  MacKenzie (2013) commented 
that any discussion of gender equality in the armed forces must include a candid dialogue 
about the sexual violence epidemic.  The Pentagon’s annual reports have documented the 
rise of sexual harassment and assault (DOD SAPRO Reports, 2013/15).  Farnell (2009) 
lamented that early Western history and (Greek) mythology portrayed women as a 
“source of temptation” (p. 17), but Simons (2001) referenced Freud who nearly a century 
ago noted that “Thanatos and Eros are hard to keep apart,” but it is “easier when sources 
of temptation just aren’t around” (p. 98).  By 1998, controversy over women in the CF 
reached a head after media exposure of allegations of rape and sexual harassment 
(Winslow & Dunn, 2002).  Much like other militaries, it raised questions about the armed 
forces culture and women’s place in that culture (Winslow & Dunn, 2002).  Maginnis 
(2013) interviewed Heather MacDonald, a researcher for the Manhattan Institute, and she 
warned that Eros “is an indomitable force,” and when introduced in combat units “you 
will inevitably have an explosion of sex...and a spike in sexual assault” (p. 75).  General 
Dempsey faulted an “established psychology” for creating that type of environment 
(Barry, 2013, p. 22).  Based on a retired general officer interview, McNulty (2012) 
explained that creating a “culture of inclusion” is a solution to the pre-existing exclusion 
argument (p. 153).  MacKenzie (2013) supported the “potential need for cultural 
evolution” within the armed forces (p. 129).  However, Maginnis contended, “this 
cultural ‘evolution’ is not inevitable, and cultural norms cannot alter basic physiology” 
(p. 52).   
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Physiology and Psychology 
There are physiological and anthropometric differences that place women at a 
distinct disadvantage when performing certain tasks – especially the physical rigor 
necessary in combat (Epstein et al., 2013; Tarrasch et al., 2011).  Farnell acknowledged 
that biological differences impact a woman’s ability to endure excessive and prolonged 
ground missions.  Military-oriented studies have shown that on average women possess 
30 to 40% less isometric and muscular strength than men in both the upper and lower 
body (Martin & Nelson, 1985; Sharp et al., 2002; Tarrasch et al., 2011; Epstein et al., 
2013).  As Epstein et al. (2013) noted, “muscular endurance is among the most important 
physical requirements for many military tasks” (p. 2,679).  On the other hand, Farnell 
(2009) maintained that it takes more than strength and stamina, and that remaining 
healthy and fit in protracted environments requires proper training, commitment and 
competence.  Tarrasch et al. (2011) said that, in general, “no studies have assessed female 
soldiers’ psychological reactions to military life,” the stress involved, or “their 
professional survivability” (p. 306).   
Farnell faulted “artificially imposed cultural restrictions” for the consistent 
societal attitudes, and wrote that such views are rooted in historical misperceptions about 
women being “intellectually inferior”, too emotional, and “overall less capable than men 
in most everything” (p. 17).  Even “perceived lack of emotional resilience or 
aggressiveness” has been cited as concern by other militaries in relation to combat role 
requirements (Barry, 2013, p. 23).  Farnell further claimed that there is “no compelling 
statistical or factual data to sustain these views” (p. 17).  On the objection to the 
emotional aspect projected on women, medical studies have shown men and women’s 
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brains to be wired differently.  In fact, women have a multi-tasking brain, and the 
emotional portion of the brain is far more developed in females than males (Shepherd, 
2013).  For men, the aggressive portion is more developed, and they logically face 
situations differently (Batrinos, 2012).  Hence, there are psychological differences 
between the genders, but those differences do not create inequality.   
When studying the IDF, Tarrasch et al. (2011) sought to identify moderating 
factors that would facilitate the successful integration of women into combat units.  
Tarrasch et al. pointed out that women who choose combat service may have to cope with 
additional stressors beyond what is equally experienced among the men.  For example, 
male soldiers maintained that women create problems to the normal routine by adding to 
their already-high existing workload (Fenner, 1998; Tarrasch et al., 2011; Titunik, 2000).  
Hence, fear of rejection or alienation serve as sources of social stress for female soldiers 
(Tarrasch et al., 2011).  Grossman (2008), who provided a detailed account on the 
psychology and physiology of combat, mentioned that extreme stress, when unchecked, 
is destructive to the emotional and physical well-being of a person.   
Tarrasch et al. studied a sample of 450 soldiers, including 235 women and 80 men 
from an IDF combat battalion, and a control variable of 135 women from a non-combat 
medical course.  The researchers hypothesized that stress levels of women in combat 
roles will be higher as compared to that of men in combat and women in non-combat 
roles (p.306).  Furthermore, stress levels will be mediated by psychological attributes of 
the soldiers, and “stress levels will be negatively correlated more strongly with physical 
health among female as compared to male soldiers” (Tarrasch et al., 2011, p. 306). 
Questionnaires were administered to assess trait characteristics two months prior to the 
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start of basic training, and assessing state characteristics before, during, and after 
completion of basic training.  Trait characteristics were measured by hardiness – defined 
as the personality characteristic that “facilitates handling stress by avoiding undesired 
reactions to stressful situations” (Tarrasch et al., 2011, p. 307).  State characteristics 
measured burnout and self-efficacy, which was defined as expectation or belief with 
regard to their ability to cope with stressful situations (Tarrasch et al., 2011).  The 
researchers discovered that females experienced more stress during their basic training 
than the males regardless of their type of training.  Females in the non-combat group 
showed increased stress during the midway point of their training, were more affected by 
burnout symptoms, but tended to have higher levels of self-efficacy by the end of their 
training (Tarrasch et al., 2011).  The combat groups reported moderate levels of self-
efficacy by the end of training which the researchers accredited to end of the beginning of 
a challenging career.  Lastly, women serving in combat roles were more likely to seek 
medical attention than the other two groups (Tarrasch et al., 2011).   
Although Tarrasch et al. found that females reacted in a more intense manner 
when integrating into combat units, the authors also found that the groups differed in 
behavior regarding their gender roles based on expectations they set for themselves.  
Tarrasch et al. offered two possible explanations:  either women entering combat roles 
adapted their behavior to fit masculine norms, or these women chose combat based on an 
a priori inclination towards a more masculine sex role.  Tarrasch et al. favored the former 
explanation because it has been previously reported that female soldiers are expected to 
adapt to the governing masculine culture, and such adaptation can interfere with their 
gender identity (Chandler, Bryant, & Bunyard, 1995).  Cockburn (2013) concurred that 
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women “make painful compromises and adaptations” to fit into masculine ranks (p. 434).  
Their commitment to adopting the norms and meeting the demands may explain why 
women frequented the medical facilities more often; the increased physical exertion 
exacted its toll on their bodies (Tarrasch et al., 2011).   
Epstein et al. (2013) confirmed that several studies about workload tolerance and 
injury frequency in the military showed that women exerted themselves considerably 
more and fatigued earlier than men when carrying out routine tasks (Cline et al., 1998; 
Friedl et al., 2008; Kelly et al., 2000; Libster et al., 1999).  Also Epstein et al. (2013) 
discussed that “fatigue is a major underlying cause of injuries, and female soldiers are 
more prone to be injured than males when conducting similar military tasks” (p. 2,675).  
Over time, the extreme conditions of combat take their toll.  Grossman (2008) reported 
that “the stress of combat debilitates far more warriors than are killed in direct hostile 
action” (p. 4).  Stress adversely affects health.  Some studies have focused on gender 
differences related to PTSD and coping behaviors.     
The body of literature is growing regarding the pervasiveness of mental health 
disorders among veterans.  A few previous studies reported elevated rates of mental 
health and anxiety disorders among females, while destructive coping behaviors were 
more prevalent in males (Riddle et al., 2007).  Maguen et al. (2012) examined the mental-
health care consequences of deployment and combat exposure among the newer 
generation of Iraqi and Afghan war veterans.  The data were collected by means of pre- 
and post-deployment screenings from a large army medical facility as part of the army’s 
health reassessment program (Maguen et al., 2012).  The studied sample included 7,251 
military personnel (6,697 men and 554 women) based on the variables needed for 
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appropriate analysis.  The researchers also sought to identify gender differences in MST.  
As hypothesized, the researchers found men to report greater exposure to combat than 
women, while women reported experiencing MST more often than men (Maguen et al., 
2012).  Traumatic experiences (exposure to death, witnessing killing, killing, and MST) 
were all significant predictors of PTSD.  In addition, men screened higher in rates of 
substance abuse, but there were no significant gender differences with respect to PTSD 
symptoms (Maguen et al., 2012, p. 313).  Symptoms of depression in adjusted and 
unadjusted analyses, however, were more likely to be associated with females.  Overall, 
the researchers found minimal support to the differential effects of combat stressors on 
the mental health of male and female veterans, but PTSD was statistically significant in 
relation to injury and gender.  The limitations to the study included the sample population 
and the single medical facility which meant the results could not be generalized to other 
locations, service branches, or veterans of other wars.  Maguen et al. (2012) noted that 
“gender differences also may change over time and future research should examine these 
gender differences in mental health outcomes longitudinally” (p. 315). 
Mattocks et al. (2012) produced a qualitative study to examine the deployment 
experiences of U.S. female service members including their experiences with combat 
exposure, gender discrimination, MST, separation anxiety, and the nature of their post-
deployment coping strategies.  The researchers explained that their study is “nestled in a 
larger research study, the women veterans cohort study [WVCS]” which was a two-phase 
longitudinal study examining healthcare utilization, healthcare costs, and health outcomes 
among male and female patients in care of the VA (Mattocks et al., 2012, p. 539).  Of 
phase two female participants, 19 volunteered to participate in semi-structured interviews 
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with a trained qualitative interviewer (Mattocks et al., 2012).  The interview format 
would allow the participants to speak freely about their military experiences.   
At the conclusion of the study, the researchers accessed the VA’s administrative 
and clinical data to determine the mental health conditions of each woman based on 
review of mental health diagnoses (Mattocks et al., 2012).  PTSD, depression, and 
anxiety disorders were the primary focus owing to their prevalence among veterans.  Of 
the interviewees, 32% were clinically diagnosed with PTSD, 11% with major depression, 
and 11% had an anxiety disorder (Mattocks et al., 2012).  The researchers identified two 
major themes among the women:  stressful military experiences and post-deployment 
reintegration problems (Mattocks et al., 2012).  Those two categories were further broken 
down into subgroups.  Combat-related experiences, MST, and separation from family fell 
under stressful military experiences, while PTSD was related to reintegration problems 
such as disrupted relationships with family and friends.   
Mattocks et al. (2012) also listed post-deployment coping strategies into three 
main coping behaviors:  behavioral avoidance, cognitive avoidance and behavioral 
approach (p. 541).  Behavioral avoidance included binge eating or purging, compulsive 
spending, over-exercising, and prescription drug abuse.  In addition, those activities were 
preferred by some women to be done in isolation which is representative of cognitive 
avoidance.  Lastly, the behavioral approach utilized by some women involved 
constructive activities such as routine exercise, individual counseling, or reaching out for 
help through female support groups.  Overall, Mattocks et al. found that military-stressors 
experienced by some women have been consistent with prior studies including women’s 
coping strategies.  The policy implications of the study revealed a need for gender-
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specific mental health treatment and substance abuse counseling for females that are 
victims of MST (Mattocks et al., 2012).  Mattocks et al. hope that post-deployment 
intervention specific to female veterans will promote positive coping mechanisms leading 
to long term healthy recovery. 
The documented experiences of female service members in Iraq and Afghanistan 
underscore the counterinsurgency operations, but training for conventional warfare is still 
a strategic priority for the armed forces.  Epstein et al. (2013) produced a comprehensive 
overview of the fundamental gender differences which are pertinent to physically 
demanding occupations.  For purposes of the study, Epstein et al. examined a light-
infantry battalion within the IDF.  The researchers’ goal was to offer a firm 
“physiological basis that may facilitate the development of physiological and physical 
employment standards” (Epstein et al., 2013, p. 2,673).  The researchers covered 
physiological differences in body composition, cardiovascular system, and the 
musculoskeletal system.   
In absolute terms, Epstein et al. (2013) reported that females had lower 
cardiopulmonary capacity, lower anaerobic power, lower muscular endurance, and lower 
bone density when compared to males.  Anthropometric data indicate that lower bone 
density creates greater risk for stress fractures (Epstein et al., 2013; Moran et al., 2008; 
Tommasini et al., 2005).  Stress fractures are among the most common overuse injuries.  
Roy (2011) reported that musculoskeletal injuries experienced by an infantry brigade 
deployed to Afghanistan were primarily caused by overuse.  All combat soldiers are at 
risk, though cumulative data show the occurrence of stress fractures as higher in female 
soldiers than males (Bijur et al., 1997; Gam et al., 2005, Jones et al., 1993; Wentz et al., 
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2011).  During training and deployments, soldiers will face environmental stressors as 
well that impact health and performance.  Gender-related differences account for 
disparities in heat and cold tolerance.  Women thermoregulate less effectively than men 
thus exposing women to greater risk of heat-related injuries (Epstein et al., 2013).   
When applied to the external stressors of military service, every physiological 
deficiency makes women more susceptible to overuse injuries and fatigue which create 
difficulties in operational readiness (Epstein et al., 2013).  Grossman (2008) claimed that 
physiological factors are inadequate indicators of combat performance because so much 
depends upon individual characteristics.  Indeed, Epstein et al. (2013) noted that their 
study applied to the female gender as a whole and not individual case study.  The 
preoccupation with measuring individual capabilities, however, is something that Simons 
(2000) foresaw as a problem.  The individuals eventually have to function as a unit, and it 
is the unit which is “marshaled into battle”, therefore unit performance should be 
measured and analyzed (Simons, 2000, p. 452).   
Epstein et al. suggested that physiological observations be taken into account 
when planning combat fitness and training protocol.  Common sense measures included 
balanced diet to counteract iron and calcium deficiencies, differentially dividing carry 
loads between soldiers, and reducing incidence of overuse injuries through proper 
education of commanders and subordinates (Epstein et al., 2013).  The researchers noted 
that changes in training protocol in the IDF – such as gradual progression in physical 
training and recovery periods from weight-bearing exercises – decreased the rate of stress 
fractures from 30% to 10% (Epstein et al., 2013, p. 2,683).  Tarrasch et al. (2011), also, 
recommended “tailor-made training” in regards to helping women cope with the 
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psychological stressors specific to combat roles (p. 309).  Furthermore, mission-oriented 
operational doctrine purportedly helps make female integration achievable.  Epstein et al. 
explained: 
Lower fitness…did not prevent accomplishment of the specific missions 
assigned, which were carried out successfully by both female and male 
soldiers.  Thus, although females have an initial disadvantage 
physiologically…the IDF experience is that a thoughtful doctrine, which 
takes account of the soldiers’ physical abilities, enables successful 
integration of females in combat professions (p. 2,684). 
Epstein et al. (2013) concluded that knowledge gaps still exist about preventive measures 
for overuse injuries and enhancing performance by implementing proper training 
protocols.  Still, the researchers remarked that other militaries have drawn similar 
conclusions regarding the feasibility and success of female integration in combat units 
(Epstein et al., 2013). 
Foreign Militaries 
Valuable lessons can be drawn about gender integration from countries that have 
already opened combat positions to women (MacKenzie, 2013).  Simons (2001) 
mentioned that experience from foreign allies affords us an “unprecedented advantage” 
when shedding light on “how effective integrated combat units can be” (p. 99).  Israel is 
probably the most prominent example cited in which women consist of 34% of the IDF 
(Haring, 2013).  The physiological study produced by Epstein et al. was focused solely 
on the IDF.  Military service is a mandatory for Israeli women, and Israel is the only 
country with such a requirement (Epstein et al., 2013).  Israeli women actively fought in 
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their nation’s war of independence in 1948; the same year the IDF would be established.  
However, female Israeli soldiers were removed from frontline duty after that war when it 
was discovered that Arab enemies fought more fiercely to destroy units comprising 
women (Epstein et al., 2013; Maginnis, 2013).  Contributing to that decision was the 
possibility of Israeli women becoming prisoners of war and subjected to further abuse by 
the enemy (Maginnis, 2013).   
Dr. David Guttmann, a professor of psychology and behavioral sciences at 
Northwestern University medical school, spoke at a 2009 symposium on “Islamic Terror 
and Sexual Mutilation” (Glazov, 2009).  Accordingly, Dr. Guttmann noted that Israeli 
female POW’s were routinely tortured and mutilated in the most obscene ways (Glazov, 
2009).  Nonetheless, Israel would later reverse its decision.  By the mid-1990s, gender 
equality advocates demanded that combat positions be open to women.  In 1999, a 
gender-integrated light infantry company was formed and soon expanded into a battalion 
in which women compose 68% of combatants (Epstein et al., 2013).   
In 2000, Israel’s Military Service Law was amended to permit women the right to 
serve in any position in the IDF (Izraeli, 2009, para. 21).  A 2003 IDF study 
recommended that women continue to be excluded from infantry, artillery, and armor 
units because of physical weakness (Dietz, 2011).  A 2007 study commissioned by the 
head of the IDF personnel study seemed to contradict the previous study and 
recommended that women be permitted to serve in all units (Dietz, 2011).  However, the 
IDF’s elite direct combat roles remain closed to women (Epstein, et al., 2013; Maginnis, 
2013).  Senior veteran combat commanders expressed concern about Israel going too far 
in pushing for women in direct ground combat (Maginnis, 2013).  The Associated Press 
48 
 
 
 
interviewed retired Major General Yaakov Amidror who said that women will never be a 
match physically in frontline units (Sergel, n.d.).  Retired Major General Yiftach Ron-
Tal, who led the process of gender integration, now expresses strong doubts about any 
further integration of women into combat units (Maginnis, 2013).  Ronen (2011) reported 
General Ron-Tal’s statement: 
It turns out that the amount of stress fractures suffered by soldiers is 
dozens of percentage points higher among women than among men.  As a 
result, the female soldiers are not required to carry as much weight.  I 
think that women’s service in combat roles in the IDF should not be 
widened…mostly because of operational considerations.  The army must 
not allow this thing to interfere with its operational ability….Women’s 
service in roles not suited to them might harm state security (para. 4). 
The General’s comments and concerns corresponded to Epstein et al.’s (2013) conclusion 
that selecting females based on military-oriented physical tasks is still in question. 
When the British army first lifted gender restrictions, it discovered a substantial 
rise in musculoskeletal injuries in female soldiers (Gemmell, 2002; Tarrasch et al., 2011).  
Epstein et al. stated that “musculoskeletal injuries are a major concern in the military 
since they directly affect soldiers’ combat readiness” (p. 2690).  After extensive analysis, 
the U.K. found that only 0.5% of the country’s female population had satisfactory levels 
of fitness to meet infantry requirements (Barry, 2013).  The British MoD determined that 
lower physical fitness would not constitute justification for exclusion, but the potential 
adverse affect on unit cohesion was more serious (Dietz, 2011).  The potential risk of 
undermining combat effectiveness with mixed-gender teams in close combat operations 
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was grounds for retaining the exclusion policy.  In addition, very few female soldiers 
expressed any desire to serve in direct combat roles (Barry, 2013). 
Since the early 1980s, women were permitted to serve in all combat specialties in 
the Norwegian military (Haring, 2013; Maginnis, 2013).  A former Norwegian Colonel 
commented that few women are attracted to the infantry positions, but those that are have 
to meet the physical standards (Mulrine, 2013).  Overall, the Norwegian military only has 
a professional force of about 11,000 and roughly 8,000 conscripted soldiers (Maginnis, 
2013).  Furthermore, Norway has the additional protection of falling under the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.  Norway has reported that operational effectiveness has 
increased with women and there is no evidence of adverse impact on unit cohesion 
(Cawkill et al. 2009; Haring, 2013).  Canada reported similar findings to that of Norway 
on operational performance and cohesion (Haring, 2013). 
Canada first began evaluating women for infantry training in 1987.  By 1989, the 
tests led to the opening of all combat positions to women in the CF, and Dietz (2011) 
reported that Canadian women were serving in ground combat roles in Afghanistan.  In 
2011, Canada deployed 310 women in designated infantry, artillery, armor, combat 
engineers, and pilots to Afghanistan (Bell, 2011).  No objective data was provided to the 
press, and the CF refused to provide statistics on how often women were used in combat 
in Afghanistan (Maginnis, 2013).  A former Canadian commander did affirm that the 
protective nature of some male soldiers resulted in them carrying women’s workloads or 
attempting to protect them on the battlefield (Maginnis, 2013).  Moreover, the risk of 
sexual assault was ever present.  Captain Nichola Goddard, the first Canadian woman 
killed in action, wrote in correspondence to her husband that six rapes occurred in her 
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camp in one week (Fortney, 2010).  The association of the perpetrators was not 
mentioned, but the result was the need for nighttime escorts.  It is a similar problem that 
U.S. female service members face in the war zone and the need for male escorts after 
dark (Maginnis, 2013).  Overall, Canada is having difficulty recruiting enough women 
for combat jobs (Barry, 2013; MacDonald, 2013). 
Lastly, Australia, one of America’s closest Pacific allies, has begun its trial 
experiment in opening combat to women.  Australia’s policy almost mirrors that of the 
United States in terms of the planning phase which began in January 2013, and the full 
implementation set for 2016.  The decision to remove gender-restrictions was driven by a 
series of sex scandals (Maginnis, 2013; Mulrine, 2013).  Women compose 14% of active 
Australian forces (Mulrine, 2013).  The Australian plan entails a “try before you buy” 
approach in hopes to encourage female participation (Pearlman, 2012, p. 28).  As of 
recent reports, “no serving army or air force women have sought combat positions”, and 
only three responses were generated from its navy (Maginnis, 2013, p. 87).  Women 
currently serving can apply for combat provided they meet all requirements.   
Overall, foreign case studies provide additional confirmation that women have 
competently fulfilled combat support roles, and the United States can learn from others’ 
mistakes or successes (Maginnis, 2013).   
Summary 
Egnell (2013) mentioned that emphasis on “lean and mean” organizations, which 
is also a goal of the Force 2025 and Beyond initiative, “indicates the potential 
contribution lies in how and with what conviction armed forces conduct operations” (p. 
40).  More importantly, Egnell views the transformative potential of women in combat, 
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namely changing combat culture, as a far-reaching positive consequence of the new 
policy.  Collective intelligence, creative thinking, and information gathering and analysis 
were all cited as positive contributions that women can offer to combat branches (Egnell, 
2013; Haring, 2013; King, 2013).  Dietz (2011) concluded that the removal of gender 
restrictions will restore the merit-based nature of the military.  Nonetheless, perceptions 
and realities about women in combat have to be analyzed on both sides of the debate.    
Creating a feminine minority within a traditional masculine environment can lead 
to anger and the belief that the profession has lowered its standards (Tarrasch et al., 
2011).  Training in gender-integrated groups can narrow gaps in fitness, but significant 
differences between the genders will remain even after basic training (Epstein et al., 
2013).  Physiological arousal still interacts with performance, and direct combat missions 
will demand a level of aggression, physical strength and stamina beyond the capability of 
almost all women (Epstein et al., 2013; Falk, 2012).  King (2013) pointed out that “on 
purely physiological grounds, the exclusion of women from the infantry is still seen by 
many as appropriate, even necessary” (p. 21).  Maginnis (2013) recorded retired Rear 
Admiral, and physician, Hugh Scott’s explanation about gender inabilities: 
…is due to the naturally occurring, unalterable anatomical and 
physiological differences in physical strength and endurance that exist 
between males and females, which is hormonal in nature, and cannot be 
ignored without jeopardizing the lives and safety of all members of a unit, 
and degrading its ability to carry out a successful mission (p. 75). 
Maginnis insisted that “no amount of training or education can change these 
physiological traits” (p. 24).  Furthermore, in similarity to the British MoD conclusions, 
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General Dempsey fears, though not explicitly stated, the risk of sexual tension being 
introduced in mixed-gender combat teams (Barry, 2013).  On the one hand, sexuality can 
be exploited, and concern exists that the behavior of male soldiers and commanders will 
change (Barry, 2013; Simons, 2001).  According to Buckley (1997),“no edict will ever 
eliminate sexual activity when men and women are thrust together at close quarters” (p. 
69).  Moreover, MST still overshadows the armed forces even before the newest form of 
gender integration was announced.   
  The findings presented in this chapter reveal the need for further research into the 
relationship between gender and the military and the changing nature of war.  In addition, 
what can be gathered from the literature review is an illustration of what Schön and Rein 
(1994) described in the problem of reframing: 
For all these reasons, there is no possibility of falsifying a frame; no data 
can be produced that would conclusively disconfirm it in the eyes of all 
qualified, objective observers….There is no way of perceiving and making 
sense of social reality except through a frame….Those who construct the 
social reality of a situation through one frame can always ignore or 
reinterpret the “facts” that holders of a second frame present as decisive 
counterevidence to the first (p. 30).      
Existing research does not offer any easy answers to the policy controversy but certainly 
bring to light the competing frames over assigning women to combat.  Assessing the 
growing role of women in the military is still a strategic priority.  Sometimes the same 
frames used in rhetoric serve a function in action (Schön & Rein, 1994).  For the U.S. 
military, women in combat has become policy in practice, and frames influence 
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institutional mechanisms, procedures, and patterns of behavior “that determine what 
policies actually mean in action” (Schön & Rein, 1994, p. 32).  With the military under 
criticism for lack of progress in implementing gender integration, it is important to 
examine what, if any, challenges commanders have faced and what protocols better 
facilitate the process.  In Chapter 3, I define the methodology to address the research 
questions associated with this study.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
 
 
Chapter 3:  Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine the organizational 
climate of a local combat brigade and to explore the following: (a) any challenges 
associated with the implementation of the recent combat inclusion policy, (b) the 
perspective of commanders regarding the policy mandate.  The purpose was also to 
determine if their perceptions reflect any change in cultural thinking.  Field artillery and 
infantry units represent direct combat units at the forefront of the policy change.  An 
army combat brigade was selected for purposes of providing a snapshot of a broader 
organizational change.  Lin (2014) pointed out that the military has recently faced 
criticism for its lack of progress in implementing the new policy.  Capturing the point of 
view of army infantry and artillery commanders tasked with facilitating the change 
should provide insight into why progress has been deficient and what internal 
preparations are being conducted.  Furthermore, physical standards have been a primary 
concern related to women in combat (MacKenzie, 2013).  As such, I sought to examine 
how physical standards will be factored into implementation, and what can be done to 
minimize risk to new female recruits. 
The review of relevant literature included testimony and recommendations by 
active and retired officers that revealed conflicting frames within military personnel over 
the elimination of gender restrictions in combat.  Some literature confirmed Maginnis’ 
(2013) warnings about the disproportionate physical and psychological harm experienced 
by women in military service (Epstein et al., 2013; Maguen et al., 2012; Mattocks et al., 
2012).  Some quantitative data was provided related to the attitudes of civilians and 
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military-affiliated persons regarding women’s presence in the military and in combat.  
Epstein et al. (2013), King (2013), and Tarrasch et al. (2011) attempted to outline 
conditions to ensure successful integration of women into combat units.  Haring (2013) 
and MacKenzie (2013) suggested that the debate should be rendered obsolete by the fact 
that there are no established set of occupational standards for combat.  Epstein et al. 
concluded that the body of literature pertaining to physiological differences and their 
impact “on military competence should be reviewed with caution” (p. 2,685).  
Methodological differences in the way studies are conducted can distort the conclusions 
“and can even be contradictory” (Epstein et al., 2013, p. 2,685).  In addition, as 
previously mentioned, Farnell (2009) wrote that winning the policy fight would not 
simply result with change to military culture.  According to Farnell, in order for women 
in the military to be viewed as equal to men, perceptions have to change. 
In this chapter, I discuss the qualitative methodology and the research questions 
used in this study.  I also outline the participant recruitment process, the data collection 
phase, the data analysis procedures, and issues of trustworthiness.  I then discuss the role 
of the researcher in the section on trustworthiness. 
Research Design 
The research questions guiding the study were as followed:   
RQ1:  How is the integration of women into combat roles perceived with regards 
to the strength and survivability of the unit?   
RQ2:  How do male and female officers perceive the effect that America’s future 
military conflicts will have on women assigned to ground combat operations?   
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Creswell (2009) mentioned, under characteristics of qualitative procedures, that a 
“study may be organized around identifying the social, political, or historical context of 
the problem under study” (p. 176).  The literature review provided some social, political, 
and historical context to the issue of women in combat.  The best sources of empirical 
research have been reliable qualitative interviews or quantitative survey techniques that 
provide useful information of the experiences of American women in combat (King, 
2013).   
With military combat culture being at the center of the policy controversy, it 
could be suggested that an organizational ethnography be employed to study an entire 
military culture-sharing group.  However, ethnography typically involves a larger unit of 
analysis, extensive observations of the group, and the focus would be on determining 
how the culture works (Creswell, 2013).  To get an in-depth study involves a smaller 
group of participants.  Grounded theory would require the process of integration to have 
been completed in order to obtain participant perspective.  Moreover, the goal of this 
study is not to develop a theory.  Phenomenology would limit the study to a single 
concept or idea, and narrative research would limit the data gathering to the life 
experiences of one or two individuals.  For purposes of this study, exploring the issue of 
women in combat can be better served in the context of case study research. 
Instrumental Case Study 
Case study research involves exploring “in depth a program, event, activity, 
process, or one or more individuals” (Creswell, 2009, p. 13).  Accordingly, I examined 
the event or process of women being integrated into direct combat assignments.  More 
specifically, I conducted an instrumental case study because I selected a single 
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organization (a combat brigade of an army division) to illustrate the issue.  Instrumental 
case study research provided a detailed picture of the combat brigade as it undergoes 
significant organizational change.  Although informative, only a small number of 
individual case studies have been produced that highlight successful instances of gender 
integration (King, 2013).  Multiple perspectives are needed to provide a holistic account 
(Creswell, 2009).  A single case study is likely to be made up of many smaller cases such 
as the stories of specific individuals and organizational units (Patton, 2002).  The 
commanders of field artillery and infantry units, comprising the brigade element, are the 
selected representatives for the “real-life” case in progress.  The interview questions used 
in this study are designed to elicit the perspectives about gender integration from the 
standpoint of army commanders tasked with implementing the combat inclusion policy.  
A list of open-ended questions to be asked during the interview process is provided in the 
appendix section.   
Participant Selection 
 When selecting participants in qualitative research, purposeful sampling means 
that researchers deliberately choose participants who have firsthand knowledge or 
experience of the central phenomenon or issue being explored (Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2011).  This study used nine participants based on a purposeful sampling strategy.  Each 
interviewee was contacted via email, by phone or in person and informed about the study.  
Subsequently, his or her participation was requested.  Written permission was obtained 
by willing participants and stored in accordance with research guidelines.  The 
participants were recruited from a combat brigade element.  Interviews were conducted at 
a time convenient for each participant.  Currently, where I reside, there was only one 
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combat brigade actively experimenting with opening combat roles to women.  In turn, it 
was meant to serve as a template for how the other statewide combat units follow suit.  
The brigade cannot be specially identified without compromising the confidentiality of 
the site and the participants.  The participants included one brigade commander, three 
battalion commanders, and two battery commanders.  In order to gain female officer 
perspective, other units were reached such as divisional support command and aviation 
units.  The aim was to interview 3 to 4 female officers.  The majority of participants were 
male officers because of their proximity and involvement in directing implementation 
efforts.   
Ethical Considerations 
Rudestam and Newton (2007) pointed out the two main ethical concerns of social 
science research are needing fully informed consent of participants and the need for them 
to emerge unharmed from the process (p. 276).  No experimental research is being 
conducted that would turn the participants into test subjects thereby increasing any risk of 
harm.  Written consent was obtained from all willing participants.  Furthermore, the 
names and positions (ranks) of participants are kept confidential and not disclosed for any 
reason.  All transcribed information from interviews was stored on the researcher’s 
private computer.  The research sites and participants are not identified or published in 
the dissertation.  A member check strategy was employed to make sure the participants’ 
viewpoints were accurately recorded.  After the interviews have been conducted and the 
data transcribed, the participants were offered copies of the transcripts to make sure they 
were not misquoted or misrepresented.  Member check validation is critical to make sure 
my understanding of what is happening corresponds with participants in that setting.  A 
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copy of the research proposal was submitted to the Staff Office of the Judge Advocate 
along with a request letter to The Adjutant General (TAG).  Each state has an Adjutant 
General who is the senior chief administrative officer and is in effect the commander of 
all the state’s military forces.  To be granted access to the target population required 
permission from TAG since all the participants are subordinate to TAG.  Permission from 
TAG, though, was conditional upon vetting and approval from the university IRB.   
Data Collection Procedures 
Rudestam and Newton (2007) explained that “qualitative methods tend to focus 
on understanding experiences from the point of view of those who have lived them” (p. 
35).  Qualitative interviews were the primary data collection technique.  Commanding 
officers of infantry and artillery units were purposefully selected given their role and 
responsibility in the policy implementation.  Female officers were also interviewed to 
validate or offer competing perspectives.  The purpose of the study was explained to 
participants prior to data collection along with giving the approximate length of time for 
the interview (30 to 45 minutes) and receiving informed consent.  Semi-structured open-
ended interviews were conducted face-to-face at a setting of the participant’s choosing, or 
via telephone.  Their responses were taped on a digital voice recorder.  Open-ended 
interviews invite more detailed answers to the issue at hand.  The commanders’ 
perspectives are helpful for providing insight and information into how they are 
accomplishing the task or what challenges they are facing.   
Case data consist of all the information accumulated about each case: interview 
data, observations, and documentary data (Patton, 2002).  Documentary data can include 
any public documents, newspaper clippings, or official reports that outline the research 
60 
 
 
 
issue.  Supporting data obtained from documents provided background and helped 
explain the attitudes of the organizational members under scrutiny.  Recording 
impressions in a personal journal also occurred during the data collection phase.  Other 
qualitative sources of information preferred included unit strength reports, memorandums 
issued by senior leadership, recruiting and retention reports, revised training manuals, 
budgetary information, and/or secondary data from previously conducted surveys.  Patton 
(2002) mentioned that “quantitative data can be a part of a qualitative case study” (p. 
449).  If possible and with the participants’ approval, gathering field notes by observing 
physical fitness exercises and/or joint-training sessions would be another potential data 
source.  Informal and conversational interviews with the leadership during such training 
sessions would aid in the data collection procedure.  Ultimately, any unclassified 
information the army provides, about the implementation efforts, is useful.  Unclassified 
information can include manuals, regulations, directives, personnel rosters, technical 
orders or any information about the designation, strength, mission, or combat posture of a 
unit.   
Data Analysis 
Qualitative data analysis is principally inductive in nature –arguing from the data 
to a general theme or conclusion (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).  The search for themes is 
characteristic of all qualitative data analysis.  In general, the data analysis in the research 
consists of three strategies:  organizing the data, coding the data, and then representing 
the data.  Coding is the primary feature of qualitative analysis.  The digital recorded 
interviews were transcribed for purposes of coding and grouping the codes into themes.  
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The most convenient approach was to utilize NVivo computer software program to 
properly store the text documents for analysis.   
Public documents or official reports that deal with the research issue are also 
potential data sources to be imported into the computer software program.  The data 
analysis plan involved a contextualizing strategy to look for patterns across the 
interconnecting narratives from the officers’ interviews - looking for possible points of 
tension and conflict within the transcribed text.  In contextualizing, the emphasis is on 
context in the study (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).  The importance is given to forming a 
description from the data and contextualizing the description with the framework from 
the literature (Creswell, 2013).  In essence, the army officers to be interviewed were 
treated as key informants.  Patton (2002) explained: 
Key informants are people who are particularly knowledgeable about the 
inquiry setting and articulate about their knowledge - people whose 
insights can prove particularly useful in helping an observer understand 
what is happening and why (p. 323).   
With the weight of responsibility falling on the shoulders of these officers, they are in the 
best position to give expert input into the potential challenges or how effective the 
implementation efforts are or will purportedly be.  Patton (2002), however, warned that 
data from informants represent perceptions, not truths, and their perspectives are 
necessarily limited and biased.   
Perceptions are pertinent to defining the concept of frames, but multiple data 
sources are needed to strengthen the confidence in whatever conclusions are drawn.  The 
purpose is to see if the officers’ viewpoints reflect broader perspectives or if conflicting 
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frames exist between commands.  Frames are taken for granted in the realm of policy 
making (Schön & Rein, 1994).  Schön and Rein (1994) claimed that “we are usually 
unaware of their (frames) role in organizing our actions, thoughts, and perceptions,” 
though they exert influence on “what we see and how we interpret what we see” (p. 34).   
Issues of Trustworthiness 
  Schön and Rein stated that “in order to reflect on the conflicting frames that 
underlie policy controversies, we must become aware of our frames” (p. 34).  As a 
combat veteran, I already have familiarity with military culture and served in a combat 
unit similar to the participating organization under study.  On the one hand, that is helpful 
for promoting confidence and having rapport with the population, but at the same time 
my professional judgment could be construed as being influenced by my familiarity.  Any 
credible research strategy requires the researcher to adopt an objective stance with regard 
to the issue under study.    
Ensuring credibility is an important factor in establishing trustworthiness.  
Triangulation is very useful in adding credibility to the generated conclusions (Patton, 
2002).  Different kinds of data may yield different results “because different types of 
inquiry are sensitive to different real world nuances” (Patton, 2002, p. 556).  
Combinations of interviews, observation, and document analysis provide opportunity for 
cross-data consistency checks (Patton, 2002).  For example, qualitative sources can be 
triangulated by comparing observations with interviews (ex. joint training sessions 
involving coed personnel), checking interviews against policy or program documents to 
corroborate what the participants report, or comparing perspectives of people with 
different points of view (ex. female vs male officer perspective).  Patton (2002) explained 
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that “understanding inconsistencies in findings across different kinds of data can be 
illuminative and important” (p. 556).  Themes established based on converging sources or 
perspectives from participants can add to the validity of the study (Creswell, 2009).  In 
addition, data was verified through the member check process to confirm that the patterns 
drawn from the qualitative data accurately reflect the interviewees’ perceptions.  Overall, 
triangulating methods and data sources holds the most promise for strengthening the 
trustworthiness of the study.         
Summary 
 This chapter explained the use of an organizational case study to capture the 
viewpoints of local army commanders undergoing the changing conditions in the 
research setting of traditionally all-male combat units.  Female officer perspective was 
also sought to provide additional insight.  The participants were purposefully selected, 
and the interview questions presented in the appendix will best help in understanding the 
issue. The data was collected via in-depth interviews, observations and qualitative 
documents.  NVivo software provided the means for coding the data and establishing 
themes based on observations and perspectives from the participants.  After analyzing the 
findings, I presented the overview of the results in Chapter 4.     
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Chapter 4:  Results 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this instrumental case study was to examine the internal 
preparations of a local Army combat brigade with regards to opening direct combat roles 
to women, including any potential challenges and/or successes they are experiencing. The 
case study was designed to capture the perspective of commanding officers, as key 
informants, in direct combat arms units (infantry and field artillery) and provide 
information on the progress of the implementation efforts.   The research questions that 
formed the foundational background for the interview questions included the following:   
RQ1:  How is the integration of women into combat roles perceived with regards 
to the strength and survivability of the unit?   
RQ2:  How do officers perceive the effect that America’s future military conflicts 
will have on women assigned to ground combat operations?   
In this chapter, I present the findings of interviews conducted with commanders 
who bear responsibility and provide oversight in the implementation efforts of the female 
inclusion policy.  I examined the perceptions and experiences of these officers 
undertaking the process of integrating women in their respective combat arms unit. 
Data Collection 
The data collection process started through peer-to-peer (snowball technique) 
recruiting.  The method of data collection involved semi-structured interviews with open-
ended questions (see Appendix A) designed to elicit detailed responses about women in 
combat and the changing nature of war.  A few female officers were also sought out from 
support positions to gain their perspective as well, and fortunately I had the privilege of 
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interviewing the first successfully integrated female fire direction (field artillery) officer 
in the state.  Owing to confidentiality, neither the specific combat brigade nor the state 
within which it is located is identified.  Overall, there were a total of nine participants. 
Table 1 
Participant Demographic Information 
   
  Gender  Command level  Command description 
 
P1  M  Battery  Field artillery 
P2  F  Battalion  Public affairs 
P3  M  Battalion  Infantry 
P4  F  Brigade HQ  Logistics 
P5  M  Battalion  Field artillery 
P6  F  Battery  Field artillery 
P7  M  Battalion  Infantry 
P8  M  Brigade  Infantry/ Field artillery 
P9  M  Battery  Field artillery 
 
The assigned number to each participant was merely determined by the order in which 
each became available for interview.  The date and time of each interview coincided with 
a time convenient for each participant.  A female intelligence officer who initially agreed 
to participate later withdrew herself from consideration, and another officer expressed 
interest in participating through an intermediary but did not respond to repeated invitation 
requests.  Owing to proximity issues, not all the interviews were conducted face-to-face 
as denoted in Chapter 3.  Furthermore, other potential qualitative sources, such as 
recruiting and retention reports, budgetary information, and organizational command 
climate survey results were not permitted to be released by the officers for purposes of 
this study.  Last, I did not collect direct observational data, though one participant did 
provide audiovisual material of artillery gun crew live fire exercises from a recent 
training period.  Consent forms were sent to each participant and were subsequently 
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signed by the participants.  I conducted three interviews face-to-face, and the remaining 
via telephone.  The location of each face-to-face interview was chosen by the 
corresponding participant.  I was in a private home office setting for purposes of the 
phone interviews.  On average, the interviews lasted between 40 to 65 minutes.  The 
interviews were recorded on a digital voice recorder and immediately transcribed upon 
each completion.  In addition, I reviewed unclassified documents such as memorandums, 
technical reports and implementation plans that coincided with data gathered from the 
interviews.   
Because of the evolving nature of the issue of women in combat, recent 
revelations are added that had not yet occurred during the time frame of the previous 
chapters.  For example, the Army Ranger School graduated its first two female 
candidates in August 2015, but they were still unable to join the elite 75th Ranger 
Regiment which requires additional schooling (Associated Press, 2015).  During that 
same month, the chief of naval operations, Admiral Jon Greenert, announced that the 
U.S. Navy SEAL training program would be open to women (Larter & Myers, 2015).  
Furthermore, when the decision was still pending to open all combat roles to women, 
Defense Secretary Ash Carter issued a memorandum in October 2015 asking civilian and 
military leaders not to publicly discuss the women in service review (WISR) until he 
reached a final decision (Wong, 2015).   
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Marine experience would be referenced 
periodically.  Any recommendations to keep certain combat specialties closed would 
have to be based on “a rigorous analysis of the knowledge, the skills and abilities needed 
for the position” (HQDA Execution Order 097-16 to the U.S. Army Implementation Plan, 
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2016, p. 2).  An extensive study was conducted by the Marine Corp on mixed-gender 
units in simulated combat situations.  For five months, the mixed-gender units’ 
performance was tracked against all-male units (Philpott, 2016).  During one of my 
interviews, an officer mentioned the results of the marine review that revealed that 
mixed-gender units performed slower, had more injuries, and were less accurate when 
firing weapons.  The lone exception was field problem-solving.  Based on the data from 
that study, former Marine Commandant, General Joseph Dunford recommended that 
infantry positions remain closed to women (Wong, 2015).  General Dunford was still 
commandant at the time of the study, but he was slated, shortly afterward, to replace 
General Dempsey as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  However, Secretary 
Carter reached a different conclusion based on the marine data, and by December 2015 
the Defense Secretary ordered the military to open all combat positions to women 
without exception by the beginning of January 2016 (Kamarck, 2015; WISR 
Implementation Plan United States Marine Corp, 2015).  As one commander remarked 
during our interview: 
 P7:  …you can definitely see some resistance from the Marines (regarding 
integrating females in combat), they’re the ones that are the most vocal, and most 
recently the Commandant of the Marine Corp doesn’t agree with it. 
 
P7:  I think, with the policy side of it, if we go back a few years, whether we’re 
talking about former Secretaries of the Army, current Secretary of the Army, had 
asked that echelons down to brigade combat teams to evaluate what inclusion 
would look like and try to assess it.  And it seems, very quickly, it was turned 
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around on its head where they said ‘no, you’re going to do that’.  I don’t think that 
there was that transition period to accept it and to build it out. 
 The combat brigade selected for this case study was initially designated as the 
test bed for evaluation in the state and basically act as a template when rolling out 
implementation in the other combat brigades.  However, based on Secretary Carter’s 
announcement, the brigade commander said, “I think they are now opening it up across 
the board given the memo from Division that it should be open to all units” (personal 
communications, August 23, 2016).  The U.S. Army had fielded its first female infantry 
officer in April, 2016 (Browne, 2016).  At the time my interviews, the participating 
infantry commanders mentioned that they have not yet had females enlisting to fill 11 
bravo (infantry) positions.  The brigade has the infantry slots available and expects the 
opportunity to get females integrated from enlistments, and the assumption is that they 
will see an increase in strength in those infantry units once they are integrated.  Unless 
females are simply not interested in those infantry positions, the timeline cannot yet be 
known.   
With the latest developments in the policy mandate, the respondents shared their 
reactions to the external policy environment including perspectives regarding the 
Marines’ experience, the Ranger School, the U.S. Army implementation plan, the state of 
civil-military relations, and the registration of women for the draft.  The only evaluation, 
internally, for the brigade thus far is in its successful integration of the first female 
artillery officer.  As long as the training succeeds for some recent recruits, the brigade 
expects the eventual addition of another qualified female fire direction lieutenant, two 
enlisted female artillerymen, and a supply specialist in its combat units.     
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Data Analysis 
Data analysis for this study consisted of organizing the data (transcribing 
interviews into text data) and then reducing the data into themes through a coding process 
and subsequently representing the findings.  The analysis of the data was conducted 
following a traditional approach as outlined by Wolcott (1994):  Highlight certain 
information in the description    Identify patterned regularities    Contextualize with 
the framework from literature   Display findings.  The Defense Secretary specified 
seven concerns that must be addressed by each service branches’ implementation plans 
(HQDA Execution Order 097-16 to the U.S. Army Implementation Plan, 2016, p. 3; 
WISR Implementation Plan USMC, 2015, p. 2): 
1. Transparent Standards – assigned tasks based on ability, not gender. 
2. Population Size – equal opportunity may not equate to equal participation. 
3. Physical Demands and Physiological Differences – mitigate injury rates. 
4. Conduct and Culture – integration of women may require a cultural shift in 
previously all-male career fields. 
5. Talent Management – adherence to a merit-based system must continue to be 
paramount. 
6. Operating Abroad – some areas of the world do not share the same principles. 
7. Assessment and Adjustment -  integration will involve commitment to the 
monitoring, assessment, and in-stride adjustment that enables sustainable success. 
The officers interviewed for this study all addressed these concerns in some shape or 
form with their responses.  Some of the themes that were developed from the responses 
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resembled these concerns.  For instance, Table 2 condenses officers’ comments and how 
it fits into the Secretary’s concerns: 
Table 2 
Sample Comments and Relation to Concern 
Participants  “Made comments relating to”  Specified concern 
 
P1, P2, P3  Gender-neutral standards  Transparent Standards 
P1, P2, P4, P7, P8, P9 Equality    Population Size 
All   Physical demands   Physical Demands 
P1, P3, P5, P6, P8 Organizational Culture  Conduct and Culture 
P1, P2, P5, P9  Job capabilities   Talent Management 
All   Past/Present battlefields  Operating Abroad 
P3, P4, P7, P8  Logistics    Assessment & Adjustment 
 
 
Coding is a central step in the analysis process which involves “reducing the data into 
meaningful segments and assigning names for the segments” (Creswell, 2013, p. 180).  
During the transcription of interviews phase, I began precoding by italicizing and/or 
underlining certain salient points made by the officers that appeared to provide additional 
insight or reflected perspectives and data discussed in the literature review.   
Table 3 
Sections From the Literature Review That Emerged in Participant Responses 
Literature Review Section    Participants 
 
Equal Opportunity to Serve    9 out of 9 
Unit Cohesion      5 out of 9 
Physiology and Psychology    6 out of 9 
Foreign Militaries     4 out of 9 
 
 
For example, responses that involved references to foreign militaries included: 
 P1:  Israel has successfully integrated women, so it can be done. 
 
71 
 
 
 
 P3:  At least in my unit, the one thing I can say, they fairly recently did some 
exercises with the Canadian Army, and the Canadian Army was fully integrated. 
And what they saw was that the female soldiers that were part of the Canadian 
Army that were integrated into the infantry, were high-performing female 
soldiers.   
 
P7:  I worked with some foreign militaries that have females integrated in front 
line units, and they seem to do just fine.  Where I have my concerns, it is a 
transition that won’t be without its issues….I think the best thing to do is look at 
the other militaries across the world, how they’ve done it and where they’ve seen 
successes and challenges. 
 
P8:  …the Soviets and the Israelis integrated female snipers.  I think we’re 
potentially missing out on half the population.  And as the United States 
population gets less and less qualified physically for service, you have to open up 
the flow in of those coming in to fulfill those slots, male or female. 
The literature section on unit cohesion had further examined the categories of 
organizational culture and subculture of all-male units, the issue of sexism and sexual 
impropriety, and civil-military relations theory.  The digital recorder, both for face-to-
face and telephone interviews, was able to help in capturing trace expressions of laughter 
or determine if there was hesitation in the participant’s voice.  This would be noted in 
parenthesis next to the transcribed text.  On the one hand, the limitation to phone 
interviews is the absence of body language which is an obvious indicator of a person’s 
attitudes or emotions.  During the face-to-face interviews, the body language most 
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present was hand gestures to emphasize certain words.  In addition to precoding, other 
techniques for identifying themes throughout the interview data included word repetitions 
and key-words-in-context.  Checking the interviews against policy or program documents 
helped corroborate what the participants discussed, as well as comparing perspectives of 
people with different points of view in order to ensure credibility.   
The transcribed interview data was verified through the member check process to 
confirm that the patterns drawn from the qualitative data accurately reflect the 
interviewees’ perceptions.  Themes established based on converging sources or 
perspectives from participants would add validity to the study (Creswell, 2009).  After 
reviewing the interview data and related documentary information, such as declassified 
department memorandums, implementation plan execution orders, and technical reports, 
four primary themes emerged.  The first theme related to job performance.  The second 
theme related to uncompromised standards.  The third theme related to civil-military 
relations.  And the fourth theme related to the generational gap or generational 
differences.   
Presentation of Results 
The frame-critical approach was the conceptual framework used for this study.  
The frame-critical approach is an approach to policy making, and frames, which represent 
beliefs and perceptions, can impact a person’s policy position and/or decision-making 
process.  Wilmot and Hocker (2007) mentioned that “perception is at the core of all 
conflict analysis” (p. 9).  Indeed, the opening remarks of one of the infantry commanders, 
regarding his perspective on the policy mandate, stated, “I’m in favor of it.  I do see 
challenges with it.  In particular, perception is one of those challenges…” (P3, personal 
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communications, July 29, 2016).  The perceptions of the interviewed officers help in 
understanding their attitudes going forward with the implementation phase of gender 
integration in direct combat units.  The first research question dealt with how gender 
integration in combat arms is perceived by commanders with regards to the strength and 
survivability of the unit.  The aforementioned infantry commander said: 
  One of the main reasons I’m in favor of it is because we always talk strength, and 
…if we get qualified females that are able to move into those roles, it will actually 
helps us increase the amount of people we can bring into formation….So at least 
from my perspective, in my unit, I don’t see a large backlash.  I expected a 
backlash against it but I haven’t seen that…and for the most part the leadership is 
looking for opportunities to lead the way to integrate in order to take advantage of 
the opportunities for strength and also to just get the better…you figure the 
females that want to join the infantry are going to be the females who are the 
strongest and you want to get those ones when they first come in (P3). 
 Another infantry commander commented: 
  …we have females that work in the forward support company, and nobody seems 
to care; it’s not a big deal…the concerns that people thought would originally be 
there, I don’t think it exists, and if you’ve ever seen those surveys we have, the 
unit/command climate surveys, it’s less than a deal than I originally anticipated it 
would be.  I definitely thought there would be some sexism, and it really doesn’t 
seem to be there.  Now when we look at…do we take direct combat role down 
another echelon, do we put females in the line units, participating literally in that 
direct combat role, then I think that’s where you start to see some concerns (P7).  
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The marines referenced a review by the United Kingdom that determined that 
integration of women in ground combat units would negatively impact combat 
effectiveness because survivability is one of the factors in which there is no known 
mitigation strategy; a conclusion that was reinforced by the marines own peer reviewed 
research that highlighted the physical disparities between males and females 
(Memorandum for the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2015, p. 6).  The marine 
perspective thus far seems to be one of disinterest regarding opening combat roles to 
women, and General Dunford appeared at odds with the other service branches and the 
Secretary of the Navy (Baldor, 2015).  As Phillips (2015) wrote, “the disagreement 
between the Marine Corps and the Pentagon is a rare public display of tension in a culture 
that generally values silent professionals” (para. 15).  Moreover, up to August 2016, no 
females had successfully completed the marine officer infantry course (Browne, 2016).  
A couple of the participating army officers commented that: 
 P1:  The Marine Corps has their infantry officer course, and some people have 
complained that it’s biased against women.  But it’s a very difficult course, 
physically and intellectually, and it’s biased against weak and stupid people 
regardless of who you are.  And I don’t see it as a bad thing or an insult to say that 
women on average are weaker than men. There are women that stand out as 
exceptions but not the rule….The marines have done it the right by opening their 
infantry officer school to women, but they haven’t changed the standards one bit.  
Same with the Ranger School. 
 
 P7:  Even if you look at the few women who graduated Ranger School, ones that 
are in infantry officer basic courses, whether army or marines, you’re 
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seeing…there’s a standard there; I think they’re pushing so hard to make 
something fit that naturally has not evolved.  I think it’s absolutely fair to open it 
up; I have males that don’t meet some of the standards. 
As previously mentioned, job performance was the first theme developed out of the 
interview data, and there was a general consensus of support among the participants: 
 P1:  I support the mandate; that’s my official answer as an officer, but it’s also my 
personal answer.  I really do support it.  My biggest concern as a leader of troops, 
as far as the individual soldier goes, is whether or not that soldier can do the 
job….The bottom line is simple performance.  If someone can do the job, that’s 
the most important criteria. 
 
 P2:  As far as opening up combat MOS’s to all, male and female, I have to go on 
record and say if they can do the job, they should be allow to do it. 
 
 P3:  Overall, I’m in favor of it.  My perspective as a commander is that right now 
I already have females in the infantry battalion.  They’re not in the infantry slots, 
but they are in the infantry battalion already.  And even when I was company 
commander in Iraq, I had females actually out with us when we were conducting 
patrols.  So in my experience there are challenges, and I will talk about the 
challenges, but in my experience it is not a role that I think is limited to only 
males…. And if you look at other armed forces, they have integrated females into 
those roles, and they have been successful. 
 
 P4:  I’m not against it; I personally don’t want to go that direction….I’m all for 
females getting the opportunity to all these different positions.  It’s not something 
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that interested me; I never wanted to be, maybe a combat engineer, but not 
infantry or field artillery….I like that doors are opening, it just has a lot of 
changes that have to be ironed out, I think. 
 
 P5:  I have females in my headquarters battery and my support company, but 
they’re all in non-combat MOSs at this point.  They’re service support and 
support personnel, medics, cooks, mechanics, those types of MOS duties at this 
point.  And I’ve been dealing with that for about the last ten years or so, and 
really no issue there in bringing them into the force and having basically a coed 
force….As far as implementing them into the force, integrating them in, I didn’t 
really see an issue with it other than you now had to have separate barracks for 
females and males where before you didn’t have to worry about it.  But that was 
probably the biggest change I noticed as far as integrating them into a combat 
arms unit…otherwise, a soldier is a soldier is what it came down to. 
 
 P6:  I’m obviously happy that the ban is finally lifted.  I was previously enlisted, 
and I actually support a field artillery unit, so timing wise…they lifted the ban and 
it kind of felt like it was perfect.  I was about to commission; they had just given 
us the ‘okay’, and it just felt like everything was aligning.  So, I’m happy that it 
happened because I love my job now, I love my unit, I love what I get to do.  I 
don’t think I could fit any better into a branch like I do this one. 
 
 P7:  My thing is that as long as the women are able to perform the role of the 
infantryman, then to me it (the gender issue) is irrelevant, the whole thing goes 
back to, regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, gender, it doesn’t matter; we’re all 
77 
 
 
 
green, and as long as everybody can perform whatever that green standard is, then 
we’re fine.   
 
 P8:  I think it probably goes along with what we’ve seen under the last ten years 
with the changes regarding the military.  Starting with the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
transition over to more recent things about transgender.  So under the 
administration, not too surprising going toward this, but I think it’s something 
that’s doable but it’s going to take a transition period in a number of ways to 
make sure it’s carried out successfully. 
 
 P9:  …I have no issue with women serving in combat roles just as long as they 
conform to the same standards that’s required off all soldiers in that position.  We 
have males that can’t meet that standard so they’re moved to other MOSs or job 
skill sets, same should be for women…. If they’re able to meet the physical 
standards, we should give them that right, and they have that right because it’s a 
volunteer force…if they can’t meet those standards and they still want to serve, 
they have to look at other roles that they can serve in to serve their country.  
Because no matter whether you’re an artilleryman, a cook, a MP, anything, the 
overall mission is that we’re serving and protecting our country.   
The supportive position of these commanders regarding women in combat roles remained 
contingent upon the fact that standards, physical or otherwise, would not be 
compromised.  The U.S. Army implementation plan states that, “The Army will maintain 
standards, improve readiness and capitalize on lessons learned through formal studies and 
previous integration experience” (HQDA Execution Order 097-16 to the U.S. Army 
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Implementation Plan, 2016, p. 4).  As such, uncompromised standards were the second 
theme to develop.  The following statements addressed this issue: 
 P1:  There are plenty of jobs in the military I can’t do…and they have inflexible 
standards for a reason, because ultimately you have to be able to do the job. 
 
 P2:  It (the army) cannot change the standards to meet the gender….They must 
keep the physical requirements in place, and they need to be held to that standard.  
There’s no cheating.   
 
 P3:  I’ve been an infantryman for awhile…if I could get rid of the males in my 
unit that can’t meet the standards and replace them with a female that could meet 
the standards; I’d do that in a heartbeat.  Because, what I see, the bigger danger is 
allowing people who don’t meet the physical standards, male or female, into the 
infantry. 
 
 P5:  My only concern with it is that the standards remain the standards; that they 
don’t lower the standards to accommodate the women.  That’s my only concern 
about it; otherwise I have no issue with it. 
 
 P6:  The last thing I would want is someone to try to throw it in my face that I 
only got my position because they lowered the standards.  And I think any female 
in the branch would feel the same way….and speaking with my male 
counterparts, we all shared that same concern that they were going to lower the 
standards because of us, and I don’t think any of us really want that.  You’ll find 
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that the women, who really want to be in the branch, don’t want it because of a 
compromise; they want it because they earned it.  
 
 P9:  Standards should be for the job and not based off gender….In regards to 
allowing women in combat arms, when it comes down to the actual executing 
mission, I’m all for it so long as they meet the requirements. 
The above female officer (P6) addressed the concern regarding a possible lowering of 
standards within that quote.  Similarly, other officers commented on this as well: 
 P4:  I fear that they will drop the standards…. If we want ten[women] to pass and 
if none pass, let’s drop the standard a little bit, but then if we want ten to pass and 
then five of them pass at this standard, then ‘ok’ that’s sufficient…. There’s a 
reason why we have the standards, and I think there will be people who are 
willing to risk saying ‘this isn’t working out’. 
 
 P7:  …if you go back even before the first female Ranger graduates, when they 
had the first female Sapper school graduate, which is the combat engineers, the 
first graduate of that was actually one of my classmates, and I had a whole bunch 
of buddies who went through class with her, and the standards were not upheld 
for her to graduate.  So that was very much trying to force something, to make it 
fit to show that we’re progressing, and I don’t agree with that.  If it means we 
have to re-evaluate the standards, to make it more inclusive, that’s fine so long as 
it never changes what the mission is and what the expectations are.  I’ve worked 
with females…and there absolutely are differences, and it’s not fair to not 
acknowledge them and the challenges that come along with them. 
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In January 2016, then-head of the Southern Command, Marine General John 
Kelly was dubious that more women would successfully enter the infantry if the current 
standards are upheld (Browne, 2016).  The standards for the Marine Corps have thus far 
proven overwhelming for female applicants.  Data obtained by the Associated Press 
reported, over a five-month period beginning in 2016, that 6 out of 7 female recruits and 
40 out of about 1,500 male recruits failed to pass the new routine of pull-ups, 
ammunition-can lifts, a three mile run and combat maneuvers required for movement into 
training for combat arms (Baldor, 2016).  An interview given by General Kelly, as he was 
heading into retirement, discussed the concerns he had.  In addition to standards, his 
statements also reflect on the theme of civil-military relations: 
 His “greatest fear,” he says, is that the vast “equal opportunity” pressure for 
women in combat roles will lead the Pentagon to water down standards… 
The reasons are obvious: On average, the two sexes simply have different 
physical virtues. Men will dominate when it comes to upper-body strength, which 
is generally vital in combat roles. And [Defense Secretary Ash] Carter has vowed 
not to alter the high standards for those roles. 
But Kelly doubts that will last: “Whether it’s 12 months from now, four years 
from now…the question will be asked whether we’ve [truly] let women into these 
other roles.” Ideologues who don’t see the results they want will ask, “Why aren’t 
[women] staying in those roles? Why aren’t they advancing as infantry people?” 
(New York Post Editorial Board, January 16, 2016) 
The literature review discussed civil-military relations theory and the idea that the 
military is shaped by two forces:  a functional and a societal imperative.  The functional 
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imperative stems from security threats, and the societal imperative is rooted in ideologies 
and social and institutional forces (Egnell, 2013).  Some theorists have emphasized the 
societal imperative over the functional – civilian control takes precedence over military 
effectiveness (Boene, 1990; Egnell, 2013).  General Kelly, as shown above, commented 
indirectly on the societal imperative and how ideology may factor into the civilian 
decision-making process.  The theme of civil military relations was also drawn from this 
case study’s interview data, with officers commenting on civilian involvement: 
P1:  What do I perceive as the most challenging aspect?  There are a couple of 
things.  There’s going to be a societal push from some corners of society that are 
going to want equal outcomes, and I don’t see that ever happening….Jobs that 
require lots of physical strength, artillerymen, even corpsman because they have 
to pick up soldiers and carry them across battlefields…anyone who has to lift 
heavy loads.  The requirements of the job aren’t necessarily bias against women, 
but they are bias against weaker people. 
 
P2:  Commanders really can’t (cave to public pressure)….Civilians can’t be 
pushing for cheating.  If they change the requirements, if they do that so more 
women can be pushed through, that’s cheating.  So if it comes down that they’re 
pushing people through because they feel pressure from civilian politicians, that’s 
wrong and officers should stand up to that and say ‘no is no’.  I mean, people’s 
lives are at stake.   
 
P5:  Yeah, I could see that coming down the road (societal push for equal 
outcomes).  I don’t know when, but I could see them wanting to push a certain 
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percentage of female recruits as branched artillery, branched infantry or branched 
armor or branched cavalry, whatever the case may be.  I wouldn’t rule that out, I 
would say it’s a definite possibility. 
 
P5:  Back in February of this year (2016), I was at division headquarters…and the 
[redacted] commanding general…would bring different people in and do 
leadership professional development.  And one of the gentlemen he brought in 
was Brigadier General [redacted].  General [redacted] was a 30 year career 
officer, Vietnam, he was Special Forces, and he was involved with starting the 
Delta Force….30 years career military and then he went into the private sector 
and worked there for 25 years.  And one of the things he said that struck me, and 
it had to do with civilian companies and civilian leadership, and basically what 
he said is there’s general lack of leadership in civilian companies and they don’t 
know how to handle troops.  So again, you have civilians pushing this stuff but 
yet they have no idea what’s involved with commanding troops or being out there 
in the dirt, in the cold, in the rain and trying to get them to perform and keep them 
motivated.  Take that for what it’s worth, but I think you get into sustained 
combat situation where you out for a month or two or three or however long 
before you get hot chow or a warm shower, I don’t know how that’s going to go 
over.  
 
P7:  …there is a reason for civilian oversight.  This is one of those things.  I do 
believe in gender equality pushed in the right direction, that’s fine, but they didn’t 
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give the opportunity, or the Secretary didn’t give the opportunity to the military to 
come up with a plan. 
 
P8:  I think what the DOD has to do is establish one of those baseline 
requirements and then have the information, the science and the support and 
everything else to back it up to say ‘these are valid, these are realistic’, and 
secondly they have to make sure they’re making it challenging enough that some 
men will not pass as well.  So there might be societal pressure on it in the name of 
equality….So I’m sure it’s going to go back and forth for many years as we go 
through this integration policy, and I think they’re doing reviews every year, or 
monthly.  So really it’s going to be a matter of are we establishing standards that 
are realistic, that are feasible, that apply across the board to all genders, so that 
there is nothing to discriminate in the standard, there’s only discrimination in the 
accession based upon that individual soldier’s performance….It will take several 
years to do this, and we got to make sure all the support systems are in place so 
that you don’t have an E1 (private) going into a unit alone with no other support.  
A cohort almost has to go in to that particular company or battalion to make sure 
that whichever females are first in do have that mental, psychological and 
mentoring support that they need to be successful in that particular branch. If you 
look at what those two women did in Ranger School, it’s a great indicator of the 
potential out there for females in the combat arms.  
 
P9:   Society has a way of, how am I going to word this; there’s a group for 
everything.  There’s someone out there who wants to see equality for everything 
84 
 
 
 
on every level, where everything is equal, everything is the same, everybody is 
offered the same opportunity, or saying for every one there’s another just like it, 
whether it be race or gender or nationality, whatever it is.  But unfortunately it’s 
not possible, and I don’t believe that society, however large the voice is…that it 
could ever happen.  Even if you put more money toward trying to raise the 
number of women; if they’re not out there, it can’t be done.  So I think we have to 
understand that although society may want something at that time, and this is kind 
of in the light right now, maybe five years from now, that won’t be on the agenda 
or that won’t be the main topic.  Maybe next time we have a more involved 
conflict and you see a higher death toll of women who are in combat arms, maybe 
society’s opinion changes, or the next time there’s a major conflict, the draft is 
enacted, you have women being drafted and all of a sudden society’s opinion 
changes or maybe it won’t.   
In 2015, the Associated Press, working with the RAND Corporation, released 
results of surveys that went out to 18,000 people who were in positions that were closed 
to women.  The results revealed that Special Forces service members did not believe 
women could meet the physical and mental demands of special operation jobs and 
expressed concern that department leaders would cave to political pressure by lowering 
training standards (Baldor, 2015; Groening, 2015).  Those concerns were not limited to 
just men but also women.  One of the female officers I interviewed had some firsthand 
experience working with Special Forces: 
I spent almost 5 years in a Special Operations unit working with Special Op 
forces.  It’s a joint unit, so I had the pleasure of working with SEALS, Army 
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Rangers, and Marine…and Air Force Special Forces.  So those gentlemen that I 
worked with, I was able to see what they did, and I was able to see the work they 
were required to do.  I worked very close with them, and I understood a lot of the 
aspects of the job. Because as a public affairs officer, I had to understand their 
missions.  I was in on all the intelligence briefings.…so I understood the kinds of 
requirements that were placed upon them…. Things are pretty dicey when you’re 
actually going out and you’re day after day on the front lines.  When I was in Iraq 
and go out to visit the troops, I would have to escort the media out there on the 
front lines, and I saw these men who were in these outposts day after day in the 
hot sun, and they were just drenched in their own sweat, and the salt stains of their 
clothes, and their skin was just purple from the sun.  And they lived out there in 
these outposts with no luxuries, meaning there were no showers or anything out 
there, no privacy for a bathroom…. I can’t see most women being able to do 
physically that type of demanding work for 16 months or even 12 months.  I’m 
just talking from an Army perspective.  Each service will treat this differently 
(P2). 
Both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy overrode any 
recommendations made by the Marine Corps, and thus any data produced by the army 
would likewise have no effect.  I posed the hypothetical to the commanders within this 
case study, had this combat brigade remained the center of evaluation in the state, if they 
would have made any recommendations for certain military occupational specialties 
(MOSs) to remain closed, including if they thought it would minimize risk to potential 
female recruits: 
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 P3:  I haven’t made that recommendation, and I don’t particularly see it…that a 
female can’t meet the physiological standard of being an infantryman.  I think it’s 
more difficult for a female to meet that standard, but I don’t think it’s impossible.  
And I have met females who actually outperform, physiologically, a lot of males 
who are in my unit. 
 
 P5:  I wouldn’t totally rule them (females) out on the gun crews, maybe certain 
positions, yes, but I would think they would be quite capable of doing other 
positions on the gun crews….I would give them their day in the sun as they say.  
Let them try it and see what happens.  You may find out that it is too physically 
demanding because when you get into a four, five, six round mission, you’re 
moving….If you watch a solid gun crew that has been working together, it’s like 
poetry in motion.  But again, I’d be willing to bet there are plenty of females out 
there quite capable of doing that job…there’s only really one guy who’s handling 
the round, bringing it from the ammo carrier up to the gun and sitting it on the 
tray during the fire mission.  I would think they (females) could be integrated into 
a gun crew rather easily. 
 
 P6:  Honestly no, I would think anybody would want the same thing that 
somebody else can have as long as they have earned it.  I know that for the 
enlistment process they started adding in the OPAT, where they’re having more 
physical demands where they’re enlisting soldiers to make sure that they’re 
actually able to complete these tasks.  And it’s smart that they’re finally doing 
something like that because I’ve seen plenty of soldiers that can’t even lift a 155 
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round, yet I went to training and I’m expected to load them in and take them out 
as well.  I would hope that they don’t keep anything closed just because I think it 
should be an even playing field especially since there have been females that have 
started to push the boundaries and show that we’re just as capable as you, we just 
need the opportunity to show you. 
 
 P7:  No, I’m not going to say off limits, but when we have the natural evolution of 
it, it was going that way anyways….going to back to engineers or field artillery, 
those are all things that if things were to go bad, or even my Intel or whatever, I 
can pull them back into a rear echelon and still have them fulfill their 
responsibility and do their job. 
 
 P8:  I’m not sure what recommendations I would have made as far as the 
accession that would have made it easier.  I’m not necessarily opposed to women 
in any of those occupational specialties.  But how do you set the conditions for 
that?  You don’t necessarily have only one female in a tank crew, for example, 
which is four people in one vehicle, very close quarters.  Or how do you do it for 
an infantry squad which is less than ten guys?  So one that they have somebody 
they can talk to of the same gender, so they don’t feel isolated.  Two, to the extent 
for their own safety, and three do they meet the physical requirements.  It is what 
it is right now; we’ll go ahead and integrate them to make sure they have those 
support systems in place….It’s all the other unknowns that society might be 
concerned about. 
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 P9:  If we restrict women on the 155 rounds but allow 105 rounds because we 
noticed an increase in injuries that can burdened the government down the road 
thru medical care….We’ve integrated them but based on their capability, keep it 
separated, but then we’re going back to partial integration; it still leaves that gap, 
you’re not letting us fully exercise or fully be a part of everything that’s out there, 
so it’s hard to say….Everybody gets hurt, everybody has injuries, so we take care 
of soldiers who get injured all the time.  Hopefully the OPAT and the high 
physical demands test through AIT (Advanced Individual Training) will help 
separate who can or who can’t no matter what their gender is. 
There a couple points to address from the above quotes.  First, there is the field 
artillery commander (P5) who referenced the work of the gun crews as ‘poetry in 
motion’.  After viewing provided video material of a battery crew conducting training 
exercises, from my observation, it was a fast-paced and intense operation.  This particular 
crew was operating a M777, towed howitzer system.  It was impressive to watch, given 
all the tasks involved, as the crew fired off three rounds within one minute and 15 
seconds.  With the exception of handling the artillery round, most of the tasks were more 
mental and attention to detail – reading the displays, working the gears on the gun to 
elevate and traverse it, lowering and feeding the ammo tray, setting the charge, clearing 
and swabbing the bore, to name a few.  Depending on the length of the firing mission, the 
ammo carrier’s position may be rotated among other crew members.  Secondly, two 
artillery officers (P6 & P9) referenced the OPAT (Occupational Physical Assessment 
Test).  The OPAT is a new screening test added to the enlistment process for employment 
in seven combat arms-related specialties (USARIEM Technical Report T16-2, 2015).  
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Before the OPAT, the APFT  was the only method by which the army was measuring 
physical readiness for duty.  When asked about how the military can validate 
occupational performance standards, one commander replied: 
 It’s a good question, and it’s very difficult.  How can they do it?  The question 
hasn’t been answered for male soldiers yet, and all male infantry….how can you 
validate that a guy is prepared to deploy as an infantryman?  Is it the PT test?.... I 
know that if they kicked everyone out that couldn’t pass a PT test, we would lose 
a significant percentage of the formation right off the top.  So I think the first real 
thing the Army has to do is be serious about what risk they’re willing to take in 
order to implement a standard in the first place and understand what that risk is 
going to be….Until we get answers to those kinds of questions for males, I don’t 
think there’s any way we can figure out how we’re going to do that in a different 
way because of integrating females.  The premise to that question is that there’s 
already a standard in a way to do it for the males, and how do we change that or 
how do we mitigate that for adding females, and I don’t think that premise is 
correct, at least looking at it from my logic…so you’re just adding females into an 
already broken system (P3). 
Based on other studies, the U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental 
Medicine (USARIEM) determined that APFT performance did not necessarily correlate 
to how soldiers perform physically demanding assigned tasks.  The literature review 
discussed arguments over the APFT, and the arguments cited  by Dietz (2011) and 
Haring (2013) appeared evident in the USARIEM’s position that the APFT was “legally 
indefensible” as a screening mechanism for entrance into specific MOSs (USARIEM 
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Technical Report T16-2, 2015, p. vii).  The OPAT was indicated in the army’s phased 
implementation plan.  Based on my study’s interview data,  the army is involved in phase 
3 because the assignment of female cadre has begun in this particular state.  The brigade 
commander commented: 
 ….we’re able to open it up as far as for officers where we were doing interviews 
for females equivalent for what we’re doing for males which is, if there is a slot 
open, we interviewed five or six people, and whoever was most qualified, we 
recommended that we assess them.  And that happened, I know, in the field 
artillery, for example, I distinctly remember talking with the battalion commander 
saying ‘she’s the most qualified one out there’  She’s got the background, she’s 
got the education, she’s got kind of the plan so to speak mentally how she wants 
to do this transition into a combat arms.  So I think that was the biggest thing 
which is don’t change your method by which you’re assessing officers, do the 
same method that you did just now you’re opening it up to another cohort which 
is females being considered, not just males for those particular positions.  I would 
probably recommend the same approach.  It’s really you’re opening the pool of 
candidates is what you’re doing, you’re not lowering your standards as far as 
who’s most qualified.  And the battalion commander said at that point that she 
was the most qualified of all the officers I interviewed,  so I want to take her and I 
was fine with it….Where we did it first was the battalion staff level, at the 
battalion headquarters so it’s not pushing down to the company quite yet.  And 
that’s primarily where we still see them, at the staff level, working for the 
battalion commander and the battalion staff themselves not so much down to the 
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company levels in the battalion….We just don’t have the numbers to push them 
down to the company level yet (P8).  
Figure 1 
Army Gender Integration Phases 
 
(Source:  HQDA Execution Order 097-16 to the U.S. Army Implementation Plan 2016) 
 
The purpose of the OPAT was the development of physically demanding tasks that are 
relevant to the demands of the combat arms specialty.  Soldiers’ performance on the 
OPAT would likewise serve as a predictor to their suitability for a specific combat MOS.   
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Table 4 
Most Physically Demanding Tasks of the Seven Combat Arms MOSs 
 Infantry ( & 
Indirect Fire), 
Combat Engineer, 
Fire Support, 
Cavalry Scout 
Artillery Armor 
Load Carriage Foot March  Foot March 
Repeated Lift & 
Carry 
Prepare a fighting 
position 
Transfer ammo with 
an ammunition 
supply vehicle 
Stow ammo on an 
Abrams (tank) 
Heavy Drag Casualty Drag Casualty Drag Casualty Drag 
Heavy Lift Casualty Evacuation Transfer ammo with 
an ammunition 
supply vehicle 
Casualty Evacuation 
Controlled Heavy 
Transfer 
  Load main gun on 
an Abrams (tank) 
Agility Move under direct 
fire 
 Move under direct 
fire 
(Source:  USARIEM Technical Report T16-2, 2015, p. 29.) 
 
Both the army and marines have confirmed that women have sustained higher 
rates of injury in ground combat training exercises (HQDA Execution Order 097-16 to 
the U.S. Army Implementation Plan, 2016, p. 3).  Musculoskeletal injury – overuse of 
muscles and joints – is the leading cause of restricted or limited duty, medical care, and 
disability in the military (Fuerst, 2016).  Risk of injury is still directly linked to the 
physiological differences between males and females.  That conclusion is based on the 
analysis that “a woman who is performing to the same physical performance standards  as 
a man will be working closer to her maximum capacity when carrying the same absolute 
combat load, and will fatigue sooner than her male counterpart” (Memorandum for the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2015, p. 6).  The OPAT may prove to be the 
physiological mediation the Army utilizes to validate occupational performance standards 
in order to positively influence policy on gender integration: 
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P1:  The Army’s exploring, in fact they’re going to start new recruits, but there’s 
a test that involves a shuttle run, a medicine ball throw, a dead lift, a standing long 
jump.  And it’s the physical analogy to the ASVAB where you take the ASVAB 
and create different categories.  And for each MOS, for each job, you have to 
meet certain standards in certain categories.  And they’re doing the same thing 
with this physical test.  The Army has started, or will start, the OPAT which has 
four events, it’s gender neutral and MOS specific.  So, if you’re going to be a 
medic and part of your job is picking up a stretcher, and I don’t know the 
specifics yet because it’s still very much in the planning stage, but you’ll have to 
be able to dead lift so much if you want to be a medic.  Your shuttle run will 
probably be more for your infantry-type folks where you have to get a certain 
score on the shuttle run, as well as dead lifting.  If you’re going to be a mortar 
man or artillery man where you routinely lift some artillery rounds that are 100 
lbs, you just have to be physically able to do that.  The Marines did a test where 
they knocked out some men and some women based on a gender neutral standard.  
And I think that’s the way to do it, to have a gender neutral standard because, as I 
said before, ultimately it’s the results that matter.  War is a pass/fail test, it’s not 
graded on a curve; you win or you lose.  So we need people who can do the job.  
 
P9:   Having an occupational standard really says, male or female, if you can 
perform this job then you can meet these standards, and that’s what should drive 
the force.  A physical fitness test can be skewed; you might have somebody who 
can run two miles in ten minutes but that doesn’t mean for my needs they can lift 
a 96lb round because they only weigh 110 lbs soaking wet.  So when you have 
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those MOS specific standards, it really selects the people who can perform it, 
male or female.  The OPAT is a great way, then, to initially screen what they’re 
physical ability is…as you’re enlisting, based on your OPAT and your ASVAB 
score, so now we’re looking at not only their mental capability but also their 
physical capability, in saying this is what you can select from in your MOS.  And 
once you get to your MOS, you have your high physical demands training that’s 
now going to be incorporated into the Advanced Individual Training (AIT), and 
going through that, if you can’t meet those standards, you’re not going to graduate 
from that AIT, you’re not going to be in that MOS.          
Nevertheless, on the theme of civil-military relations, congressional oversight can change 
everything.  Kamarck (2015) explained that “congress has the authority to review the 
proposed changes, provide oversight for implementation, and amend the definition of 
gender-neutral occupational performance standards as needed” (p. 15).  At least one 
commander pointed out that FETs, which was discussed in the literature review, were a 
result of military initiative, not civilian enforcement: 
 P7:  If you look at the SF (Special Forces) units, I think there’s a great 
opportunity for women to integrate into those, I think they’re called FETs…there 
is an awesome opportunity for that cultural piece; Afghanistan being a perfect 
example.  Females integrated with SF units in order to speak more directly with 
foreign females because they weren’t allowed to speak to males.  So culturally, 
there’s a great opportunity for that.  That was an example of a natural evolution, 
there was a need, and the Army figured out a way to solve it as opposed to a 
direct ‘you will do this’. 
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 P7:  I think that even with the direct combat roles, even if it had not been forced, I 
think it would have evolved into it because whether it’s incidents like that (direct 
engagement) or the FETs, we just saw the need for it.  Again, just natural 
evolution as opposed to a policy dictate. 
An additional intent of this study was to determine if conflicting beliefs or 
perceptions exist in or between a select army command structure.  For example, before 
the Secretary’s December 2015 announcement, there was a specific list of MOSs that 
were being opened to females at the time, and one of the male officer’s commented that 
he felt deprived of a qualified female during the beginning phases of implementation: 
 One of the MOSs was a 13 Romeo (radar operator), and I was talking to a female 
soldier who was unhappy with what she was doing, she’s a doctor of physical 
therapy by trade, so she’s certainly intellectually capable.  She has been an E5 
(Sergeant), and she’s been moved around as a cook, a fueler, and doing a lot of 
jobs that she’s certainly physically and mentally capable of doing, but she was 
looking for something a little more challenging than fueling trucks.  I said “hey, I 
need someone in my radar section, and they just opened these up, would you be 
interested?”  She said “yes” and I said “great,” and  I talked to my commander 
and said “they said these jobs are open and I have a female that wants to do this 
job, I need that soldier, she’s willing to do it, what do I have to do to make that 
happen?”  And that was when I was told that of [redacted] three brigades, 
[redacted] didn’t just immediately open those doors to everybody.  They picked 
one brigade and said, “We’ll do it here, we’ll experiment, we’ll see how it works 
and will figure out how we’re going to do this and then will move it out to the 
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entire division.”  So I was denied that soldier who has now moved on to other 
things.  So I lost a capable soldier because there was some inertia and caution on 
the part of senior leaders.  13R is an obscure MOS and there aren’t that many of 
them.  It’s hard to find individuals who meet the ASVAB scores to get this…and 
who have the interest in doing it.  And I had a soldier who met the standards and 
was willing to do it, and I was blocked because the folks at the very top weren’t 
enthusiastically embracing the policy (P1). 
While the lowering of standards has been a major concern, one of the battery 
commanders lamented that standards, over a course of time, have already been degraded: 
 The concern of the actual degrading of standards, if I look at the overall picture of 
the army, I feel like we’ve degraded the standards for everyone at this point, from 
how we execute, or basic training, and the level of fitness that’s required from the 
soldiers leaving basic training to the point that they’re coming back to the units 
and they can’t even complete a physical fitness test.  So in that regards, I feel the 
whole Army has slipped (P9). 
The majority of the officers agreed that the most recent combat environments, with 
women’s exposure to asymmetrical warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, contributed to the 
acceleration of women in combat arms.  However, one female officer offered a differing 
perspective: 
 If anything, I would think that our current combat situation would have deterred 
you from bringing females into it just because of who we are fighting and how 
they feel about women.  Generally, they don’t respect women and/or they cover 
them up completely.  So, I think if you wanted to say something like that (what 
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accelerated opening combat to women) it would almost be the opposite direction 
because we stand out very much in their society.  And… they don’t value women 
like our society value’s women (P4). 
Lastly, while the participants in this study had supportive positions about women in direct 
combat roles, that apparently is not the case among all those in leadership positions in or 
around the state’s combat units.  One male commander remarked, “I’ve talked with 
senior officers about this and senior NCOs (Non-commissioned officers), and I’ve heard 
some opinions that are very opposed to it.  I’ve heard less that are just really open-
minded about it (P7, personal communications, August 21, 2016).  This quote is actually 
a lead into the fourth theme about generational differences among some current 
commanders and their subordinates.   
Organizational culture, as discussed in Chapter 1, was a source of controversy 
when the lifting of gender restrictions was being introduced.  A specific question asked of 
the commanders, in my study, was how the identity of direct combat units has been 
affected by the advancement of gender equality.  The generational gap factored into their 
responses: 
 P3:  There are other things that were just always long standing tradition when I 
first joined the infantry that have gone away.  Is that necessarily related to the 
gender aspect?....I think we have lost some of the identity already as infantry, but 
that was in motion before these positions were opened up to females or were even 
integrated, it had already started.  And I think a lot of it had to do with the 
deployments and the Iraq War and what our young officers and soldiers who 
really only lived or have been in the army during the Iraq war; all they know is 
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that rotation and that deployment.  And the ability to maintain some of those long 
standing traditions is gone.  And they just don’t know them to just maintain them 
and understand them.  So I do think that some of the identity is being lost, and I 
think that has already started moving in that direction, and maybe that change in 
identity is really what is going to allow integration to happen in a way that isn’t 
going to completely destroy units or the identity of the units because I think 
they’ve already been lost. 
 
 P5:  Yeah…for old school guys like myself, it’s definitely a culture shock….I’ve 
seen quite a lot in 25 years.  I would say for younger soldiers, though, for newer 
soldiers, that’s probably all they’ve ever known is the coed unit.  But for some of 
the older guys, I think the older guys have problems dealing with it because back 
in the day it was you and all the other Joes.  And just like when guys go to 
hunting camp or whatever, a weekend away with the buddies, kind of like what it 
was when you went to training.  It was all guys and guys act like they do when 
it’s all guys….and the guys with the combat patches are fading off into the sunset.  
So, I think the total force in itself is a lot younger at least what I’ve 
seen…compared to what it was.  So a lot of those guys that were strictly in units 
that were male are probably getting to be dinosaurs like me.  Yeah, the culture’s 
changing as far as the military…but a lot of those guys from the old days when it 
was basically segregated male and female wise aren’t around anymore.  There not 
as prevalent….As far as it being a culture shock to the younger kids,  I think the 
younger kids would probably be more adaptable to it because that’s the way the 
military has been moving since they came in.  They probably were integrated with 
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females during basic training, and depending on what AIT they went to, same 
thing there.  So they may have been integrated with females from the onset of 
their military career to present day. 
 
 P6:  So far, no issues have come about for me personally, but I think the fear of 
being put under a microscope is part of it (other females being hesitant to join 
combat arms), and that’s why I think it’s really important to keep pushing for a 
level playing field….I think it’s very important to keep pushing for that so that 
you feel like you’re integrating into a unit, and I know it’s not that seamless, but I 
have noticed a lot of my younger soldiers, like a lot of my younger male soldiers 
don’t think twice about it, it doesn’t seem strange to them probably because 
they’re growing up with this kind of culture.  I know a lot of my older NCO’s are 
having a little bit more of a difficult time, I guess, trying to get accustomed to the 
integration because they came into a different kind of army, and things have 
definitely been changing, and the world around them has also been changing. 
 
P7:  There is to an extent (a generational gap), but it goes back to some of the 
males I see are getting softer, and you have these females now who are trying to 
assert themselves and being more…the one female I mentioned, that’s a lesbian in 
my unit, she’s a badass, she’s a hardcore badass.  She leads PT for the rest of her 
squad, and holy shit, she crushes them.  And I think it is generally accepted by, I 
mean it has evolved to where that millennial group doesn’t see it as much as an 
issue.  And I think the real benefit of all this is…you get a different perspective.  
So if we get into the psychology of things and the inherent differences between 
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males and females, you have a lot of females who typically think a different way 
and their approach to problem-solving can be pretty unique.  As we look at 
groupthink, that’s one of the things we try to prevent when we’re trying to solve 
complex problems.  Bringing in a different perspective or a way of approaching a 
problem is tremendous.  So I think that’s a big benefit. 
 
P8:  …the Millennials don’t necessarily potentially care about what gender you 
are as much as are you qualified, and do you meet the standards?  So there is 
going to be that generational conflict between, I think, older and younger and 
some hesitation amongst older ones.  
Some of the previous statements mentioned culture, and the integration of women into 
these combat units represents significant cultural change.  The following statements 
expand on that issue: 
P1:  The other, non societal challenge, I see, is the units that have been 
historically all-male or male dominated have a culture that is not, in my 
experience, completely in line with some of the more politically-correct aspects of 
society.  And they will have to change, and it’s a necessary change…it’s an 
obstacle to overcome.   
  
 P6:  I went into my unit not planning to change anything unless it absolutely had 
to.  I had to observe; any good leader doesn’t just go in and start making changes; 
they don’t know what’s going on, they don’t know the situation.  One of the first 
things I did was counsel my FDC (fire direction center) chief.  He and I sat down; 
we talked about the strengths and weaknesses of the FDC, and we talked about 
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our own leadership development. And I think he has a little more respect for me 
for doing that before just jumping in and trying to make change.  I’m not there to 
change the world.  I was there because I want to be a field artillery officer.  I’m 
not doing it to say ‘women can do this and women can make a difference,’ I just 
wanted to be treated like every other soldier that commissioned artillery and went 
to a line unit.  So I think when you go into it with this attitude that ‘as a woman I 
can do anything you can do,’ it’s kind of a turn off to a lot of your soldiers 
because they sit there and think you’re doing it for the wrong reasons.  And I 
think that’s something I tried to make obvious, that I was there for the right 
reason.  I was there because I like being a part of the branch, and I was there 
because I think blowing things up is awesome (*quiet chuckle after comment) 
   
 P7:  Yeah absolutely, that goes into the command climate and command 
philosophy.  So I have an interesting position where I have openly homosexual 
females in my unit, in fact two of them are married together.  When I first took 
command, I spoke at length with them to try to assess ‘what is the command 
climate?’, ‘do you guys feel like you’re made fun of or whatever?’ and 
surprisingly they were like ‘not at all’.  ‘Maybe at sometimes people ignore us 
because they don’t want to address it’.  What shocked me, we had that command 
climate survey shortly after I took command to really just figure out where I was 
at and believe or not, my sexual harassment issues do not exist with the females in 
the unit, they exist with other males.  And it absolutely blew my mind with the 
general statements; it doesn’t seem like it’s a big deal.  Maybe with some of the 
older ones who’ve been around for a long time, maybe it’s harder for them to 
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transition, but the bulk of our force is made up of that millennial generation; they 
don’t seem to care.  So there’s no reason to care, right?  Gender equality, sexual-
identity equality, as a commander or as a combat infantryman to my left or my 
right, I just need somebody who can perform the task. 
 
P8:  You don’t want to change the culture of a unit simply to open up 
opportunities, but at the same time, how do you maintain the culture while 
accepting potential changes?  Nowadays, I don’t get too far down into the weeds 
with like platoon level or company level or the battalion commanders or company 
commanders that see that on a more day to day basis.  I’m not hearing what’s 
being discussed in the orderly room among a bunch of E4s (specialists and 
corporals)….I think you can keep a large part of that broader cultural sense of 
who we are as a unit as far back as the 1700s.  The other part is that subculture 
that’s in there…which is that male culture.  And how do we make that not so 
much a male culture but an infantry culture, or an armor culture?  And there is a 
culture in the infantry, armor and artillery as far as what they do, what their roles 
are on the battlefield, what unique specialties and qualities do they have.  It’s that 
other culture, how do maintain that esprit de corp without breaking it, thinking 
that you’re making concessions just simply to do something that society thinks is 
correct?  And ultimately what’s best for the nation, the defense of nation?  Is it 
integration? ….And is American society willing to see young women die more 
routinely than they have at this point? ….That’s a societal question, that’s why we 
have civilian leaders (*laughing after comment). 
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I did ask the participants their perspective regarding a provision of the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2017 which now requires females to register for the 
Selective Service when they turn eighteen years of age.  That question ties into the 
second research question regarding future conflicts.  As pointed out in the problem 
statement in Chapter 1, Maginnis (2013) viewed the registration of women for the draft, 
albeit the next logical step after full gender integration, as a negative consequence of the 
policy.  Much to my surprise, all the participants agreed with the legislative push to 
require women to register for the draft.  The consensus among them was that if there is to 
be an equal opportunity environment, it must be equal all around.  “Equality is a two-
edged sword” (P1, personnel communications, July 6, 2016).  Now, it’s a shared risk that 
everybody has.   
Granted the draft hasn’t been utilized, and subsequently relinquished, since the 
Vietnam War, it could technically be reinstated depending on the scale of a major 
international conflict.  This does not mean women would be automatically sent to front 
line combat.  Eligibility requirements would still factor into what positions they would be 
deemed qualified to perform.  There might be a small percentage that could perform 
combat roles, while others could be drafted into other critical MOSs – intelligence, 
administrative, supply, medics, etc.  The military has been experiencing personnel 
drawdown since the 1990s (Eaglen, 2016).  It stands to reason the smaller the military 
force becomes, the greater likelihood the draft could be reinstated.   
The U.S. Army is set to be reduced by another 12 brigades in 2017.  According to 
Army Vice Chief of Staff General Daniel Allyn, the army force strength will be 460,000 
at the end of 2017, and estimated to be down to 420,000 by 2019 (Senate Armed Services 
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Committee testimony, March 15, 2016).  The Force 2025 and Beyond initiative, as 
described in Chapter 1, was proposed with a goal of creating a leaner force and adjusting 
Army strategic priorities with the demands of the geopolitical environment.  Eaglen 
(2016) explained a potential problem with this shift in force planning: 
 Today’s modified war plans are geared toward one short-duration, high 
intensity event with a country like Iran and a scenario like, say, closing the 
Strait of Hormuz.  The second war remains a traditional conflict on the 
Korean peninsula, but shorter and with a heavier reliance of on our South 
Korean allies.  Gone is any plan that foresees conflict taking longer than 
one year in duration or any contingency with a whiff of stability 
operations, long-term counterinsurgency or counter-insurrection, or nation 
building of the type seen in Iraq and Afghanistan (pp. 25–26). 
It is not known with certainty if the nature of a future military conflict will govern 
the decision to send women into the front lines, but nonetheless, women in 
combat roles is unlikely to be a policy that is reversed: 
 P6:  Honestly, I would love to say it (the nature of the conflict) doesn’t 
matter…but it all depends on the success of the mission….if you send in a whole 
platoon of women, and you know those men are not going to talk to them, are you 
really being successful in your mission?  Are you setting yourself up and your 
soldiers for success?  It comes down to what needs to be done for the mission.  As 
the creed says, I will always place the mission first.  So if that is what it requires, 
then maybe you have to sit it out.  Do you want to sit it out? No.  Does it feel like 
it’s fair? Probably not.  But at the same time, if that is what the army needs you to 
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do, you take the back seat and you do what you have to do to make sure they 
accomplish their mission.  Would I love to be right out front with my guys to 
make sure they’re getting shit done? Absolutely, don’t get me wrong, the last 
thing I want to be doing is sitting behind a desk, exactly why I joined artillery, but 
at the same time you need to know when to take a step back, evaluate the situation 
and say what is going to be the most combat effective way we can accomplish 
this. 
 
P7:  I taught, prior to my current role, history and foreign policy, and I always 
look back at WWII, which I uphold as the golden standard, where you had these 
units which were force marched 25 miles a day, carrying everything with them, so 
we’re talking rucks anywhere between 60 to 100 lbs depending on their roles and 
just having to move.  Well, our logistics ability has greatly evolved beyond what 
it was in the 1940s, but regardless we always have to plan as if we don’t have 
those things, and I can’t leave my units behind piecemeal because somebody’s not 
able to meet that standard. 
 
P7:  …we’ve had some discussions on this.  It goes back to that movement, the 
WWII standard, being able to move 25 miles.  You look at being on a front line 
and how can you integrate and all of a sudden possibly have to retract that based 
on that (standard).  So, this now goes back to the transitional period where we 
haven’t really figured and worked it out.  I think the best picture we can say it will 
happen, we have some females in the unit and we’re expecting them to do that, 
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but when push comes to shove, are there policy decisions that come down from 
higher that change that; I don’t know. 
 
P7:  It’s interesting that you (the researcher) picked the [redacted] as a case study, 
because going back to WWII standard about foot marching, the [redacted] uses 
[redacted], they have plenty of vehicles for transporting equipment and they’re 
afforded a little more extra protection.  There is the uniqueness to that. 
 
P8:  …going back to the societal piece…which is are people in favor of or 
opposed to it (placing women in combat).  So you’re going to have groups of 
people who say women are just as capable and if they meet the standards they 
should be able to fight in the contemporary environment.  And then you’re going 
to have the others who say ‘no’ we’re endangering…those women could then be 
used, if captured, potentially as propaganda and/or we’re putting them in greater 
danger because the bad guys aren’t necessarily friendly toward soldiers, and 
putting women in those positions subjects them to harsher atrocities.  So, the 
future of armed conflict, what does it look like?  It’s going to be both 
conventional and unconventional warfare.  So you’re going to have the traditional 
combat units that are fighting more traditional near peer enemies with 
standardized conventional forces of armor, infantry and all that.  And then you’re 
going to have the unconventional fight as well.  Is that the best place for a woman 
to be?  I guess if they’re qualified and capable of doing it, have the training that 
everybody else does, it shouldn’t necessarily prevent them from going into 
combat arms units. 
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P9:  I feel this moment it (the conflict governing the decision) can’t because once 
we decide to integrate, we can’t pick our battle and say ‘ok, this is the type of 
battle we’re going to fight, so now pull women out that trained to be field 
artilleryman, or infantryman, armor , cavalry scouts, and say ‘hey, we gotta pull 
them out because we’re doing a more force on force or a linear fight.’  It won’t be 
able to change; as we move forward with this, this is how we’re going to have to 
operate, this is going to be how we fight any battle no matter what type it is, 
whether it be the type we’re seeing in Iraq and Afghanistan or if it’s more of a 
conventional type fight.  Because once we build the team and they’re performing, 
and a unit gets validated and is ready to deploy, you can’t just say ‘hey, let’s pull 
them out now’, because now you created a hole where it needs to be filled with a 
new soldier who wasn’t a part of that team.  So, yeah, I definitely don’t think they 
can change that going forward. 
The costs of recruiting and training females is often higher than their male 
counterparts due in large part to women’s susceptibility to injury and the subsequent 
medical care (Maginnis, 2013).  Amara et al. (2014) produced a study to set the 
groundwork for estimating future combat-related injuries, with a primary focus on 
traumatic brain injury (TBI).  The researchers predicted that deployment-related injuries 
would likely increase because of the lifting of gender restrictions in ground combat 
(Amara et al., 2014).  Men were found to have higher rates of TBI, but women incurred 
higher medical costs overall (Amara et al., 2014).  When asked how the commanders in 
this study reconcile the costs of female recruitment while dealing with budget constraints, 
most of them did not know, had not considered it, or didn’t see the issue factoring into 
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the decision-making of the military senior leaders.  Budget cuts and constraints, in 
general, have forced commanders in all branches of the armed forces to accept risks they 
previously had not considered as they attempt to implement defense strategies (Eaglen, 
2016).  In a Department of the Navy memorandum, the marines approach to policy 
implementation stated: 
As with any policy change in the Marine Corps, leadership will be the 
most critical component to successful gender integration into ground 
combat arms occupational specialties and units.  Fully invested and 
unwavering demonstrations of support by commanders and leaders must 
set the example for Marines at all levels (Memorandum for the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2015, p. 7). 
One of the army battery commanders from this study made a statement that resembled the 
marine approach: 
I think the biggest thing I’ve had to do is keeping the male soldiers aware that this 
is coming and it’s not something we can change.  The train is already in motion, 
the wheels aren’t going to stop, so what we do is have an open mind and keep 
moving forward.  If  we don’t keep up with the change, we’ll be left behind and 
all that will do is make a less productive team that can actually do the mission.  So 
we need to embrace the change; know that it is coming whether soldiers like or 
not and then just move forward from there.  So that’s the biggest thing, engaging 
soldiers from the leadership…down through the junior enlisted and section 
sergeants, because once you get down to it, they’re going to be having direct 
contact with females in the field as either subordinates or as their leader (P9).    
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Summary 
 
This qualitative case study captured the perspective of army commanders within a 
combat brigade as they are undergoing the process of gender integration in direct combat 
arms.  Female officer perspective was also sought which in turn included the first 
successfully integrated female field artillery officer in the state.  Patterns or key-words-in 
context from the participants established the themes about job performance, standards, 
civil-military relations, and generational differences.  Comments supporting the policy 
mandate along with acknowledgement of challenges were contextualized within the 
framework of the literature review.   
There are implementation concerns regarding the potential lowering of standards, 
and females are still at a significant disadvantage from the start, physiologically, when it 
comes to infantry-related tasks.  The marine perspective was referenced to show 
agreement and/or conflict between the two branches since the army and marines are at the 
core of the policy mandate.  The OPAT is probably the most effective way to go forward 
to identify soldiers who can perform combat-related requirements. The validation process 
involves adding physically-demanding tests which are subject to continued scrutiny by 
civilian and department leaders.  Any changes can be perceived as a compromising of 
standards and likewise create the perception that women have not earned their position.  
Women in direct combat will be an issue that is constantly evolving.  In Chapter 5, I 
discuss the interpretation of the results, recommendations on future study, and some 
additional comments made by the participants. 
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Chapter 5:  Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 I conducted this study to examine the implementation efforts of gender integration 
in direct combat units.  I selected a particular army combat brigade for this case study 
because it was to serve as the initial test bed of evaluation for other combat brigades in 
the state.  However, policy changes required all military branches to open previously 
closed combat MOSs without exception, and implementation plans were to be executed 
beginning in 2016.  Because the burden of implementation falls squarely on the backs of 
combat commanders, they were likewise purposefully selected for the interview process 
to gain their perspectives regarding the policy mandate.  Both male and female officers in 
commanding positions were interviewed to discuss any challenges and/or successes they 
are experiencing as they undergo this organizational change.  Although certain 
implementation concerns still exist, the combat brigade in this case study has successfully 
integrated its first female field artillery officer, and the state is on track to have the most 
women incorporated in its combat arms units by this year (Summer 2017).  
Interpretation of Findings 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, assessing the growing role of women in the military is 
one of several priorities for the army according to the KSIL.  Two major contributors 
have led to women’s expanding roles in the military.  First, the rescindment of the draft 
and subsequent move to an all-volunteer force, and second, the demands for equal 
opportunity in all occupational fields, including national defense (Kamarck, 2015).  A 
majority of statements made by the commanders in these interviews along with 
documentary data confirmed a few arguments made by proponents of women in direct 
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combat roles.  For instance, as briefly pointed out in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, Dietz 
(2011) and Haring (2013) criticized the APFT, on a legal and practical basis, as an 
appropriate standard of measurement for inclusion in combat arms.  That viewpoint was 
reinforced in a USARI technical report that discussed the development of the OPAT.  
Secondly, the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan changed the perception about women’s 
placement in combat.   
In their work The Fourth Turning, Strauss and Howe (1997) put forth the premise 
that the future is not linear.  Prior policy on excluding women from combat roles 
appeared to be based on the assumption that future battlefields would be linear (Barry, 
2013).  The interviewed commanders were in agreement that though women were not put 
in direct combat per se, during Iraq and Afghanistan, the enemy had brought combat to 
them.  Conventional operations are still a foreseeable threat, but now it appears the 
assumption has been reversed to reflect the counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and that future conflict will reflect those campaigns.   
Combat performance has been a central theme in the overall debate, but anecdotal 
and statistical evidence provide a depiction of women performing admirably across the 
military spectrum (Pena-Collazo, 2013).  Grossman (2008) argued that once the daunting 
task of routing terrorism from the world is completed, the next task to undertake is the 
process of rebuilding nations, making them safe for democracy, and to accomplish that 
task would require peace officers and peacekeepers.  Cockburn (2013) mentioned that 
women are sometimes acclaimed as more “peaceable” than men and thus gender can be a 
resource for peace (p. 434).  It is plausible that women integrated into combat roles will 
have the opportunity to serve in peacekeeping operations of post-war scenarios.  
112 
 
 
 
Moreover, Baker (2006) suggested that women’s traditional role as peacekeepers in their 
homes could crossover into their ability to perform peacekeeping tasks as well, if not 
better than men.  In this case study, the female fire direction officer commented: 
 The whole point is to be proficient in what you do.  You need to be able to do 
your job regardless of any condition, war time, peace time, that’s the most 
important thing to the Army, and that’s one of the most important things to the 
soldiers around you because they’re going to be depending on you.  The army will 
put you where they want you…. Everybody’s integral in some way and a lot of 
the men over there (Iraq or Afghanistan) won’t let a woman talk to them.  Even if 
it’s peacekeeping, men and women have a role and they’re effective in that role 
for different reasons.  If I can’t talk to a male overseas, I might have a male 
counterpart do it, I might have a male translator do it.  If I need to go in and talk 
to a bunch of wives, maybe my male counterpart can’t do that.  And I go in there 
with a translator and now it’s on me to pull the right information.  Both genders 
have their strengths and value in that scenario and it’s difficult to say if they’re 
effective or not just because it depends on the situation (P6).    
The literature review section on unit cohesion also raised the issue of sexual 
impropriety in the armed forces.  Two of the participants pointed out that the army 
represents a microcosm of society, and can likewise experience some of the same 
problems, like sexual assault.  Some commanders commented: 
 P2:  In the military, at least, we have mandatory training every single year on 
various things to include sexual assault and rape prevention, and equal 
opportunity.  The military does a very good job of attacking that sort of thing year 
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after year after year.  So they do a very good job of reinforcing that type of 
training as compared to the general civilian population.  I don’t think it (sexual 
assault) is going to increase any more than in the general population.  The 
military is nothing more than a microcosm of society….And we also have the 
opportunity to kick people out for doing these things when we find out.  And we 
just need to get to a point where people do not shy away from reporting these 
things.  If there not reported, you can’t do anything about it.  There has to be more 
awareness, and the military does a good job on the awareness issue and on the 
prosecution issue. 
 
 P3:  Every time you put yourself in a position where males and females come into 
more contact on a daily basis, I think, from my perspective, that you have the 
increased likelihood of that happening (sexual harassment).  So I think it would be 
naïve to say that there will be no potential for that to increase; however, I think 
that that a lot of that is driven by the level of dignity and respect in the culture of 
the unit.  And I think that of all the units that the integration can occur without a 
major increase in sexual assault.  An infantry unit or a unit in which has high 
esprit de corp within the unit or brothers and sisters to the left and right, is one in 
which you will see less of that than units that don’t have that high esprit de corp.  
So, I think it would be naïve to say it wouldn’t happen, but I think actually 
integrating within the infantry, let’s say…not less of an opportunity, but people 
would be less inclined to do that in those units, but I’m speculating. 
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 P6:  To be honest with you, I don’t know about speaking for the Army as a whole, 
I know personally that they’ve been pushing SHARP (sexual harassment and rape 
prevention) training more than ever now.  A lot of people see it as power points 
that are more of a burden than education.  They are taking steps to revise the 
program and make it more relatable and actually, you know, from the moment 
you get in to the moment you get out, at least nowadays, the awareness for sexual 
harassment prevention is at an all time high.  I guess, even, from hearing from my 
own, the older NCO’s in my unit say they emphasize it because they never 
conjured this extreme to do it.  I’m sure it is in preparation for having females 
come into the arena, definitely.  I would hope that by pushing these programs, like 
suicide prevention and sexual harassment training, that male and female soldiers 
feel like they have a safe place to go to discuss these issues. 
The brigade commander, in this case study, noted the need for a cohort to be 
established to provide psychological mediation for female recruits.  In his memorandum 
about eliminating gender restrictions, former Chief-of-Staff Dempsey stated that it was 
necessary, in the beginning, for a sufficient number of women to be assigned to command 
positions in order for gender integration to be successful in the long run.  Dempsey called 
for “critical mass” to make the policy work (Press Briefing by Secretary Panetta and 
General Dempsey from the Pentagon, 2013).  However, as pointed out in the problem 
statement in Chapter 1, Barry (2013) predicted that it would be unlikely that female 
volunteers for infantry would reach the level necessary for a self-sustaining cohort.  So 
far, the combat brigade in this study has not had females enlisting to fill infantry 
positions.  It has not been defined what percentage of combat soldiers must be female to 
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make integration work (Maginnis, 2013).  As cited in Chapter 4, some of the participants 
could foresee civilian leadership pushing for a certain percentage of women to be in 
combat positions; it could simply come down to a question of when.  That perspective 
tied into the theme about civil-military relations.  In relation to the equal opportunity 
positions outlined in the literature review, two of the female commanders did not comport 
with the equality argument: 
 P2:  Coming from the perspective of a female officer, who has commanded and 
spent 22 years in the military, I have witnessed and seen that women have not 
been promoted equally…for various reasons, and that’s unfortunate.  I’ve seen it 
get a lot better during my tenure in the military; however, I don’t believe just 
opening up all aspects of military operational duties to women is going to make 
the difference….That in and of itself is not going to create equality for all women.  
As you (the interviewer) pointed out, the civilians, they made this new 
implementation of open combat to everyone as a means, it appears, to provide 
equality for everyone.  That’s not going to do it.  Is it going to cause problems?  
I’m sure it will.  Implementation problems and concerns, unit issues and concerns.  
It’s going to cause all sorts of behavioral issues we’re going to have to deal with 
even more so now….   
 
 P4:  Equal opportunity in the military has nothing to do with race or gender; it has 
to do with your physical fitness or your physical ability.  Firefighters have to go 
through a certain rigorous training, and there are not a lot of female firefighters 
either because that gear is heavy. 
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It was interesting that the commander (P4) brought up the civilian example of 
firefighters because the New York Fire Department (FDNY) has been dealing with a 
similar gender equity policy.  Specifically, in 2015, the FDNY graduated a 33-year-old 
female recruit who failed to pass its physical assessment test six times (Edelman, 2015).  
The training program she failed involved a realistic scenario of climbing in full gear 
while carrying heavy equipment, rescuing victims in zero visibility, breaking down doors, 
and doing it all while breathing oxygen from a tank on a limited timer.  However, civilian 
leaders noticed enough women were not completing the training and wanted exceptions 
to be made.  This is a valid comparison over the concern of watering down standards in 
military training which is foreseen by opponents of women in combat because of civilian 
control of the military.   
Civilian employment rights do not apply to the military.  When recruits volunteer 
to serve, they forfeit many of the Constitutional rights they take an oath to defend (Baker, 
2006).  The functional imperative of military service requires that service members 
surrender these rights in order for the military to perform its assigned function of 
protecting the rest of society… (Field & Nagl, 2001).  The functional imperative, as 
described in civil-military relations theory, is the nature of war and a “nation’s 
geostrategic setting which by necessity compels the armed forces to develop a certain 
structure and professional culture to be effective” (Egnell, 2013, p. 38).  An internalized 
organizational culture, which has been a major source of controversy over the policy 
mandate, may be the main obstacle to gender integration, but Strauss and Howe (1997) 
also applied generational theories to the cycles of history and noted that the moods and 
attitudes of a particular generation will affect its decisions.   
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Since the army is becoming more composed of the millennial generation, as 
pointed out by some of the participants, unit cohesion, as an aspect of organizational 
culture, may become less of an issue because of the attitudes of the larger millennial 
cohort.  In relation to the frame-critical approach, the cultural frame can differ among 
generations.  A soldier’s attitude, not gender, affects morale and unit effectiveness 
(Baker, 2006).  The question of diminishing morale was raised by opponents of women in 
combat; however, according to a survey conducted in 2014 by the Military Times, morale 
among military servicemembers already hit an all-time low, but the lifting of gender 
restrictions on direct combat roles was not directly cited as a reason for low morale 
(Tilghman, 2014).  The survey results indicated that “troops report significantly lower 
overall job satisfaction, diminished respect for their superiors, and a declining interest in 
re-enlistment…the all-volunteer military is entering an era fraught with uncertainty and a 
growing sense that the force has been left adrift” (Tilghman, 2014, para 6–7).   
Draconian budget cuts were also negatively impacting troop morale.  In general, 
the U.S. ground forces suffered under sequestration, losing nearly 100,000 soldiers since 
its wartime expansion including thousands of experienced noncommissioned officers 
with institutional knowledge of counterinsurgency warfare (Eaglen, 2016).  The army has 
improved its readiness since 2014, but only a third of its brigade combat teams are ready 
to fight in all types of warfare (Eaglen, 2016).  Inadequate planning and lack of clarity of 
mission led Marine General James Mattis, in his testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, to ask his civilian superiors to think about the consequences of their 
decisions.  In particular, the questions he believed Congress should ask included:  “In 
light of worldwide challenges to the international order we are nonetheless shrinking our 
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military.  Are we adjusting our strategy and taking into account a reduced role for that 
shrunken military?” (Mattis, testimony before SAFC, 2015, p. 5).  In Chapter 1, I posed 
the question about how professional military judgment is factored into civilian policy 
decisions and then highlighted examples were military leadership openly challenged 
civilian leadership.  Consequently, General Mattis’ questions or dissenting views cost 
him his occupation.  I have reason to believe, though still an assumption, that the 
commanders in this study answered honestly regarding their perspective on the gender 
inclusion policy.  Although confidentiality is provided to the participants of this study, it 
is not known for certain if occupational jeopardy influenced some of their responses to 
reflect the views of societal culture.  Pena-Collazo (2013) claimed that “it is a culture that 
presupposes women’s physical inferiority and lack of psychological and emotional 
coping mechanisms” (p. 58).  Nonetheless, physical disparity is still a legitimate concern 
as discussed in the literature review.   
Based on statistics obtained by the Center for Military Readiness, females suffer 
double the rate of injuries compared with male colleagues in army combat training 
(Scarborough, 2015).  Epstein et al. (2013) had concluded that knowledge gaps still exist 
about preventive measures for musculoskeletal injuries and enhancing performance by 
implementing proper training protocols.  That gap still exists, though the army envisions 
a screening program to understand and predict musculoskeletal injuries which are the 
most significant threat to military readiness (Fuerst, 2016).  No matter how much the 
army works at leveling the playing field, the physiological differences that make men and 
women inherently unequal cannot be universally overcome.  Women will continue to 
contribute indispensably to the army division of labor, and as long as they perform 
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competently, in spite of any relative physical inequality, in their respective occupational 
skill, they can be accepted as “sisters” and valued as professionally equivalent (King, 
2015, p. 382).   
Although the Army may have struck a balance in the validation process with the 
OPAT, some may still consider the standards to be unnecessarily high (Kamarck, 2015).  
Congress has the option, in its oversight duties, to monitor or postpone implementation 
and request further studies.  Within the conceptual framework of the frame-critical 
approach, the opposition or the advocacy frames come from honest, intellectual 
differences or beliefs.  Competing frames will continue between those who are opposed 
to the policy on philosophical grounds, namely in the tradition of valuing the defense of 
women, while advocates of the policy will continue to see it as an equality issue.   
Limitations to the Study 
 Originally, the study had the objective of obtaining more participants, but only 9 
participants were interviewed during the data collection time frame.  The participation 
that was lacking was more line company (infantry) or battery (field artillery) commanders 
within the brigade element.  Observational data was also limited.  The specific confines 
of one Army combat brigade limit the generalization of any results among the broader 
armed forces.  Furthermore, the combat brigade selected was done so under the 
expectation that it was serving as the test bed for the rest of the combat units in the state.  
However, as noted in Chapter 4, that decision was rendered obsolete by the Secretary of 
Defense’s order that all combat positions be opened to women without exception.  While 
the particular combat brigade in this study has not had any current success with female 
infantry enlistment, the does not necessarily apply to the other state combat brigades now 
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that positions are open across the board.  In addition, the absence of enlisted personnel 
perspective prevents a deeper account of the organizational climate during this transition.  
Senior NCOs such as First Sergeants at the company level and Command Sergeant 
Majors at battalion levels or higher, carry out policies and standards on performance, 
training and conduct of enlisted personnel, and can give advice or offer recommendations 
to commanders in matters pertaining to enlisted personnel.  As pointed out in Chapter 4, 
one of the battalion infantry commanders mentioned that he has spoken with other senior 
officers and senior NCOs that are opposed to the policy mandate.  As such, the potential 
for more competing perspectives remains compared to the supportive positions of the 
participants in this study.   
Recommendations & Implications 
 In Chapter 1, I noted that it would be beneficial for a long term analysis to track 
the progression of the transition the army is undergoing to determine if the organizational 
change efforts result in improved organizational performance and effectiveness.  The 
battery commander (P9) pointed out that the combat brigade from this study will have 
three to four more women incorporated into it by March 2017, so they will actually be 
able to see how the transitions are proceeding because there is no truth for certain until 
the experiment is run in real time.  A long term transitional study would help better track 
the progress, and in terms of positive social change, this state is serving as an example for 
the rest of the United States.  As the commander explained: 
 Especially with selecting a battery, it’s almost like you have the beforehand and 
then see how it goes.  And I’ll be transitioning out a year from now, so then you 
have a new commander, a new perspective, but at that point there will already be 
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women in that unit for six to eight months, so how does he take this transition 
with having women there.  So, it’s going to be five, ten years from now to see 
how it actually develops, where soldiers are in their career and how it worked out.  
(This is an issue that’s constantly evolving).  I’m happy to get my opinion out 
there, and give you that perspective from a line battery commander.  And the 
[redacted] will have the most women this time next year in a combat arms unit, so 
we’re kind of leading the way here, and I’m very excited and interested to see how 
it goes.  This time next year there will be a lot of positive comments (P9). 
 The degree of ease and success during significant organizational change is 
directly proportional to the amount of choice that people believe they have in 
implementing the change (Burke, 2011).  As quoted in Chapter 4, one of the infantry 
commanders (P7), although supportive, still thought that a proper transition period was 
denied to work out any potential issues.  For instance, sexual harassment may remain an 
issue.  Since 2011, there has been a trend of sexual harassment on the rise among male 
soldiers, making it not just a woman’s issue (Pena-Collazo, 2013).  Whether that rise 
correlates to the repeal of DADT in 2010 could be a potential future study.   
 As recently as June 2016, the Defense Secretary also removed any restrictions 
regarding transgenders serving in the military.  Gender integration may not remain at the 
forefront for long because the transgender debate is now an area for future study.  
Interpersonal relationships can become a challenge and affect a team, and those 
interpersonal relationships may become more complex when mixing in females or 
transgenders, etc.  The military has never been able to control for interpersonal dynamics 
(Simons, 2015).  The brigade commander commented regarding the transgender policy:   
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 That is a whole new level of complexity. At what point do you determine…how 
to evaluate that particular soldier by, whether it’s what you’re born with until you 
do the transition, that’s a more complex question.  But if you look at the military, 
it’s been in the lead, over its history, as far as, not social change but whether it 
goes back to the integration of minorities...under Truman to this, it has always 
been somewhat, in some ways ahead of the curve of society in ensuring some type 
of equality (P8).   
Furthermore, in terms of social change, one of the female commanders also discussed 
how the military leads the way over society in general: 
 I think the military has led the way in gender integration.  Look at how we 
integrated black soldiers in the military.  How blacks were integrated into the 
military paved the way for how women started to become integrated into the 
military.  As a whole the military has really out shown the civilian community in 
terms of integration – gender and race.  I’ve had my concerns about the military, 
and I’ve stood up for my view points over my military career.  But as a whole I 
can say the military is a very fine institution, and I have served with a lot of very 
fine people.  And we, more than the civilian community, have gone out of our way 
to promote equality….People who get promoted in the military are the people 
who can do the job for the most part.  We have ways in the military that are 
verifiably tracked to make sure that discrimination doesn’t happen….In the 
civilian community, it’s not open source like that, people are not reviewing 
everybody’s evaluation to make sure everything in there is true and factual.  So 
we have a lot of back stops in the military to ensure that there is equal 
123 
 
 
 
opportunity, not just for women, but for everybody.  It’s not perfect, but it’s a hell 
of lot better than the civilian community (P2). 
Finally, gender integration can serve as a positive source for female empowerment.  
Combat command experience is beneficial in the military promotional system.  When 
asked about her ambitions, the first successfully integrated female field artillery officer 
stated: 
 Funny that you say that, because my commander, I used to be an XO (executive 
officer) at HHB (headquarters battery), and they weren’t going to move me into a 
line battery until I went through BOLC (Basic Officer Leader Course).  Once I 
finally got through the course, back in May (2016) I graduated, my new 
commander in the line battery when I took the fire direction officer slot asked me 
what my endgame goal was, and I told him I want Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] 
job actually.  So, ultimately I would like to be a battalion commander; that’s my 
final goal (P6). 
 Personal experiences of commanders, as well as other individual soldiers, amount 
to anecdotal evidence which can easily be dismissed by social scientists, but the issue of 
women in combat is an issue that is going to require more and more data.  Evidentiary 
accounts add up to data.  Not all military personnel are opposed to women serving in 
direct combat positions, but some do oppose it.  As women and men work together in 
army combat training environments, commanders and noncommissioned officers can 
assess the professionalism and make predictions on how they might perform when 
deployed (Simons, 2015).  There may be no shortage of studies, quantitative or 
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qualitative, regarding all the particulars of interpersonal dynamics in the military.  Until 
data saturation is reached, data collection is where this issue will remain fixed. 
Conclusion 
Whether organizational change is resisted or embraced, all change is a loss 
experience, predominantly a loss of familiar routines (Burke, 2011).  The gender neutral 
physical requirements for each occupational specialty, as designed by the OPAT,  is 
probably the most prudent and effective way to go forward on gender integration 
including the most recent policy on transgenders.  At any given time, the direction of a 
policy is chosen by the generation in power.  The more public awareness is raised 
concerning implementation challenges or successes, the more the conversation on women 
in combat may be reshaped and likewise influence policymakers.  Given the politically-
charged nature of the topic, some military leaders, ones with practical experience, may 
believe they can’t push back publicly.  In the end, the societal imperative, of civil-
military relations, overrides the functional imperative.  Ultimately, throughout the history 
of warfare, the political context has been more important than the military context, and 
the issue of women in combat, which is continually evolving, will eventually take its 
place in that history.  
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
1. What is your perspective regarding the policy mandate?  What do you 
perceive as the most challenging aspect? 
2.  Describe, if any, changes that are being made to the physical and mental 
standards to the content of training courses? 
3. How have changes, or what changes, on the battlefield accelerated the process 
of opening combat roles to women? 
4. How has the advancement of gender equality affected the identity of direct 
combat units as well as their practices? 
5. How (in what ways) can the military validate occupational performance 
standards to positively influence policy on gender integration in direct 
combat? 
 
 
